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Who Decides on Security?
AzIZ RANA
Despite over six decades of reform initiatives, the overwhelming drift of
security arrangements in the United States has been toward greater-not lessexecutive centralizationand discretion. This Article explores why efforts to curb
presidential prerogative have failed so consistently. It argues that while
constitutionalscholars have overwhelminglyfocused their attention on procedural
solutions, the underlying reasonfor the growth of emergency powers is ultimately
political rather than purely legal. In particular,scholars have ignored how the
basic meaning of "security" has itself shifted dramaticallysince World War 11 and
the beginning of the Cold War in line with changing ideas about popular
competence. Paying special attention to the decisive role of actors such as
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and Pendleton Herring, co-author of
1947's National Security Act, this Article details how emerging judgments about
the limits of popular knowledge and mass deliberationfundamentally altered the
basic structure of security practices.
Countering the pervasive wisdom at the founding and throughout the
nineteenth century, this contemporary shift has recast war and external threat as
matters too complex and specialized for ordinary Americans to comprehend
Today, the dominant conceptual approach to security presumes that insulated
decision-makers in the executive branch (armed with the military's professional
expertise) are best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicting
information about safety and self-defense. The result is that the other brancheslet alone the public writ large-face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they
call for transparency or seek to challenge coercive security programs. Not
surprisingly, the tendency of legalistic reform efforts has been to place greater
decision-makingpower in the other branches and then to watch those branches
delegate such power back to the executive.
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Who Decides on Security?
AZIZ RANA*

I.

INTRODUCTION: SECURITY, REFORM, AND THE ARGUMENTATIVE LOOP

Today, politicians and legal scholars routinely invoke fears that the
balance between liberty and security has swung drastically in the direction
of government's coercive powers. In the post-September 11 era, such
worries are so commonplace that, in the words of one commentator, "it has
become a part of the drinking water in this country that there has been a
tradeoff of liberty for security .

.

. ." According to civil libertarians,

centralizing executive power and removing the legal constraints that inhibit
state violence (all in the name of heightened security) mean the steady
erosion of both popular deliberation and the rule of law.2 For Jeremy
Waldron, current practices, from coercive interrogation to terrorism
surveillance and diminished detainee rights, provide government the ability
not only to intimidate external enemies, but also internal dissidents and
legitimate political opponents. He writes, "[w]e have to worry that the
very means given to the government to combat our enemies will be used
by the government against its enemies .... ,4 Especially disconcerting for

many commentators, executive judgments--due to fears of infiltration and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale
Law School; PhD., Harvard University. For discussion and helpful comments, I would like to thank
Scott Anderson, Ash Bali, Josh Chafetz, Alex Gourevitch, Onur Ulas Ince, Sheri Johnson, Peter
Katzenstein, Jonathan Kirshner, Mitch Lasser, Darryl Li, Odette Lienau, Alison McQueen, Ariel
Mendez, Jedediah Purdy, Jeff Rachlinski, Rob Reich, Sidney Tarrow, the members of Cornell Law
School Summer Faculty Workshop, and the members of the Stanford Political Theory Workshop. I
would also like to thank Shaan Rizvi and Olesia Zakon for excellent research assistance. In addition,
thank you to each of the commentators, David Cole, Tommy Crocker, Joe Margulies, Greg McNeal,
Wadie Said, and Sudha Setty for their willingness to participate in this volume and for their generous
and thoughtful reflections on the article. Finally, I am deeply grateful to Jamie Cole, Paul Costa, and
everyone else at the Connecticut Law Review for their invaluable editorial work.
'James B. Comey, Former Deputy U.S. Att'y Gen., Fighting Terrorism and Preserving Civil
Liberties, Address at the University of Richmond School of Law (Apr. 15, 2005), in 40 U. RICH. L.
REV. 403,403 (2006).
2 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY viii-x (1973) (explaining that
underneath the "all-purpose invocation of 'national security' ... could be discerned a revolutionary
challenge to the separation of powers itself").
3 See Jeremy Waldron, Essay, Safety and Security, 85 NEB. L. REV. 454, 485-86 (2006)
(providing as an example the Israeli measures against "internal or quasi-internal enemies of the state").
4 Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 206 (2003).
For more on Waldron's account of the prevailing trade-off between liberty and security, see JEREMY
WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND TRADE-OFFS: PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE (2010).
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security leaks-are often cloaked in secrecy. This lack of transparency
undermines a core value of democratic decision-making: popular scrutiny
of government action. As Sixth Circuit Judge Damon Keith famously
declared in a case involving secret deportations by the executive branch,
"[d]emocracies die behind closed doors. . . . When government begins
closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the
people. Selective information is misinformation."' 6 In the view of no less
an establishment figure than Neal Katyal, who until June 2011 was the
Acting Solicitor General, such security measures transform the current
presidency into the "most dangerous branch[,]"
one that "subsumes much
7
government.,
of
structure
tripartite
of the
Widespread concerns with the government's security infrastructure are
by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, such voices are part of a sixtyyear history of reform aimed at limiting state (particularly presidential)
discretion and preventing likely abuses. 8 What is remarkable about these
reform efforts is that in every generation critics articulate the same basic
anxieties and present virtually identical procedural solutions. These
procedural solutions focus on enhancing the institutional strength of both
Congress and the courts to rein in the unitary executive. They either
promote new statutory schemes that codify legislative responsibilities or
call for greater court activism. As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter
argued that only a clearly established legal framework in which Congress
enjoyed the power to declare and terminate states of emergency would
prevent executive tyranny and rights violations in times of crisis. 9 After
the Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, now State Department Legal
Adviser, once more raised this approach, calling for passage of a National
Security Charter that explicitly enumerated the powers of both the
executive and the legislature, promoting greater balance between the
branches and explicit constraints on government action.10 More recently,
5Anthony Rapa, Comment, When Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Department of Justice
and a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 233, 236-37 (2006)
(proposing reform of the state secret privilege in order to prevent executive abuses).
6 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcrofi, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
7Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316, 2358 (2006).
8 See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (providing a short overview of a sixty-year period
when scholars such as Rossiter, Schlesinger, Koh, Ackerman, Tribe, and Gudridge advocated for
reform aimed at limiting state discretion).
9 See CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE

MODERN DEMOCRACIES 306-13 (1948) (outlining proposals for reform, including strengthening and
streamlining of the legislative functions). According to Rossiter, "[i]f Congress is to play a salutary
part in future emergency governments in this country, then its functions of legislation, investigation,
and control must be streamlined and strengthened." Id. at 309.
10
See HAROLD HONGJu KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 158-61 (1990) (advocating for the necessity of national security reform
legislation). Koh wrote at the time that:
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Bruce Ackerman has defended the need for an "emergency constitution"
premised on congressional oversight and procedurally specified practices."
As for increased judicial vigilance, Arthur Schlesinger argued nearly forty
years ago, in his seminal book, The Imperial Presidency, that the courts
"had to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities" by
abandoning deference and by offering a meaningful check to the political
branches.1 2 Today, Laurence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more
imagine that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can play
a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that adjudication can
"generate[]-even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently
3
reasoned dissent-an apt language for potent criticism.'1
The hope-returned to by constitutional scholars for decades-has
been that by creating clear legal guidelines for security matters and by
increasing the role of the legislative and judicial branches, government
abuse can be stemmed. Yet despite this reformist belief, presidential and
military prerogatives continue to expand even when the courts or Congress
intervene. Indeed, the ultimate result primarily has been to entrench
further the system of discretion and centralization. In the case of
congressional legislation (from the 200 standby statutes on the books 14 to

[w]hat the Iran-contra affair underscores is the need for a new national security
charter-an omnibus statutory amendment to the National Security
Constitution-in the form of a framework statute designed to regulate and
protect many aspects of the foreign-policy-making process. Unlike the current
patchwork of laws, executive orders, national security directives, and informal
accords that govern covert and overt war making, emergency economic power,
foreign intelligence, and arms sales, such a statute would act as a statutory
successor to the National Security Act of 1947.
Id. at 157.
" See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES INAN AGE
OF TERRORISM 19 (2006) (arguing that both "Congress and the public [need to be invited] to make the
necessary discriminations" on presidential military powers); id. at 103 (explaining that "the emergency
constitution places the legislative oversight committees in the hands of the minority party," with the
courts playing "a more important role... on more-procedural matters").
12SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 418 (admonishing also "Congress, . . . the executive
establishment, the press, the universities, [and] public opinion").
13Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, Essay, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE
L.J. 1801, 1846 (2004).
14These statutes provide the President with the authority to engage in various emergency
measures during times of crisis. Approximately thirty such statutes are triggered when Congress
formally declares war, including the Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006) (providing for the
detention and deportation of citizens of "the hostile nation or government") and the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (2006) (giving the President the ability to regulate and prohibit
commerce with the enemy state and its citizens). Moreover, Stephen Dycus et al. write that "[m]ore
than 170 other standby authorities" come into effect "'in time of war' or 'when war is imminent'
without requiring a declaration of war." STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (4th ed.,

2007) (stating that these additional statutes "authorize the President to take land for military purposes;
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the post-September 11 and Iraq War Authorizations for the Use of Military
Force, to the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions
Acts' 5), this has often entailed Congress self-consciously playing the role
of junior partner-buttressing executive practices by providing its own
constitutional imprimatur to them. Thus, rather than rolling back security
practices, greater congressional involvement has tended to further
strengthen and internalize emergency norms within the ordinary operation
of politics. 16 As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no doubt
controversial, has been renewed by Congress a remarkable ten consecutive
times without any meaningful curtailments. 7 Such realities underscore the
dominant drift of security arrangements, a drift unhindered by scholarly
suggestions and reform initiatives. Indeed, if anything, today's scholarship
finds itself mired in an argumentative loop, re-presenting inadequate
remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures.
What explains both the persistent expansion of the federal
government's security framework as well as the inability of civil libertarian
solutions to curb this expansion? This Article argues that the current
reform debate ignores the broader ideological context that shapes how the
balance between liberty and security is struck. In particular, the very
meaning of security has not remained static, but rather has changed
dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. This
shift has principally concerned the basic question of who decides on issues
of war and emergency. And as the following pages explore, at the center
of this shift has been a transformation in legal and political judgments
about the capacity of citizens to make informed and knowledgeable
decisions in security domains. Yet, while underlying assumptions about
popular knowledge-its strengths and limitations-have played a key role
in shaping security practices in each era of American constitutional history,
commandeer private production lines for war manufacturing; take control of private transportation for
war transport; and sequester, hold, and dispose of enemy property, among other powers"). For more on
standby statutes, see generally DAVID M. ACKERMAN & RICHARD F. GRIMMETr, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL31133, DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (2003).
's Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3474; Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498; Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).

16For more on the normalization of emergency in American law, see Kim Lane Scheppele,
Exceptions That Prove the Rule: Embedding Emergency Government in Everyday ConstitutionalLife,
in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 124, 124-34 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo
eds., 2010) (detailing examples of foreign and domestic legislative acts which tend to "constitutionalize
emergency exceptions to normal government").
17The most recent blanket renewal, signed into law by President Obama on May 26, 2011, was
for four additional years. Tom Cohen, Obama Approves Extension of Expiring PatriotAct Provisions,
CNN (May 27, 2011, 10:55 AM), http://articles.cnn.con/2011-05-27/politics/congress.patriot.act

llone-wolf-provision-patriot-act-provisions-fisa-court?_s=PM:POLITICS.
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this role has not been explored in any sustained way in the scholarly
literature.
As an initial effort to delineate the relationship between knowledge
and security, this Article will argue that throughout most of the American
experience, the dominant ideological perspective saw security as grounded
in protecting citizens from threats to their property and physical well-being
(especially those threats posed by external warfare and domestic
insurrection). Drawing from a philosophical tradition extending back to
John Locke, many politicians and thinkers-ranging from Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison, at the founding, to Abraham Lincoln and
Roger Taney-maintained that most citizens understood the forms of
danger that imperiled their physical safety. 18 The average individual knew
that securing collective life was in his or her own interest, and also knew
the institutional arrangements and practices that would fulfill this
paramount interest. 19 A widespread knowledge of security needs was
presumed to be embedded in social experience, indicating that citizens had
the skill to take part in democratic discussion regarding how best to protect
property or to respond to forms of external violence. Thus the question of
who decides was answered decisively in favor of the general public and
those institutions-especially majoritarian legislatures and juries-most
closely bound to the public's wishes.2 °
What marks the present moment as distinct is an increasing repudiation
of these assumptions about shared and general social knowledge. Today,
the dominant approach to security presumes that conditions of modem
complexity
(marked by heightened
bureaucracy,
institutional
specialization, global interdependence, and technological development)
mean that while protection from external danger remains a paramount
interest of ordinary citizens, these citizens rarely possess the capacity to
pursue such objectives adequately. 2' Rather than viewing security as a
matter open to popular understanding and collective assessment, in ways
both small and large the prevailing concept sees threat as sociologically
complex and as requiring elite modes of expertise. 22 Insulated decisionmakers in the executive branch, armed with the specialized skills of the
18See

MARK E. KANN, ON THE MAN QUESTION: GENDER AND CIVIC VIRTUE IN AMERICA 42-44

(1991) ("[The liberal theorists] portrayed men as individuals who understood and obeyed natural law,
accurately gauged current options against future consequences, placed intelligence and sobriety ahead
of passion, and self-consciously adjusted private interests to public order ....
Locke painted the most
stunning portrait of men's rationality.").
'9 ld. at 44-45.
20
Id. at 43-45 (outlining Locke's ideas about limited government and men's participation in
political life).
21 See

AMos A. JORDAN & WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICY

AND PROCESS 112-13 (1981) (explaining that even Congress lacks the necessary expertise and access
to information).
22
1d. at 113.
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professional military, are assumed to be best equipped to make sense of
complicated and often conflicting information about safety and selfdefense.23 The result is that the other branches-let alone the public at
large-face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they call for
transparency or seek to challenge presidential discretion. Not surprisingly,
the tendency of procedural reform efforts has been to place greater
decision-making power in the other branches, and then to watch those
branches delegate such power back to the very same executive bodies.
How did the governing, expertise-oriented concept of security gain
such theoretical and institutional dominance and what alternative
formulations exist to challenge its ideological supremacy? In offering an
answer to these questions, Part II begins by examining the principal
philosophical alternatives that existed prior to the emergence of today's
approach, one of which grounded early American thought on security
issues. I refer to these alternatives in the Anglo-American tradition as
broadly "Hobbesian" and "Lockean," and develop them through a close
reading of the two thinkers' accounts of security. For all their internal
differences, what is noteworthy for these purposes is that each approach
rejected the idea-pervasive at present-that there exists a basic divide
between elite understanding and mass uncertainty. In other words, John
Locke and even Thomas Hobbes (famous as the philosopher of absolutism)
presented accounts of security and self-defense that were normatively more
democratic than the current framework. Part III then explores how the
Lockean perspective, in particular, took constitutional root in early
American life, focusing especially on the views of the founders and on the
intellectual and legal climate in the mid nineteenth century.
Part IV continues by detailing the steady emergence, beginning during
the New Deal, of the prevailing American idea of security, with its
emphasis on professional expertise and insulated decision-making. This
discussion highlights the work of Edward Pendleton Herring, a political
scientist and policymaker in the 1930s and 1940s, who co-wrote the
National Security Act of 1947 and played a critical role in tying notions of
elite specialization to a new language of "national security." Part V then
shows how Herring's "national security" vision increasingly became
internalized by judicial actors during and after World War II. It argues that
the emblematic figure in this development was Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter, who not only defended security expertise but actually
sought to redefine the very meaning of democracy in terms of such
expertise. For Frankfurter, the ideal of an "open society" was one
23

For an account of how such security assumptions are shared by both major political parties and

help to explain legal continuities across the Bush and Obama Administrations, see Aziz Rana, Ten
Questions on National Security: Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5099,
5099-5109 (2011).
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premised on meritocracy, or the belief that decisions should be made by
those whose natural talents make them most capable of reaching the
technically correct outcome. 24 According to Frankfurter, the rise of
security expertise entailed the welcome spread of meritocratic
commitments to a critical and complex arena of policymaking. This
discussion focuses especially on a series of Frankfurter opinions, including
Ex parte Quirin,2 5 Hirabayashiv. United States,26 Korematsu v. United
States,27 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,28 and connects
these opinions to contemporary cases such as Holder v. HumanitarianLaw
Project.29 Finally, Part VI, the conclusion, notes how today's security
concept-normatively sustained by Frankfurter's judgments about merit
and elite authority-shapes current discussions of threat and foreign policy
in ways that often inhibit rather than promote actual security. The Article
then ends with some reflections on what would be required to alter the
governing arrangements.
As a final introductory note, a clarification of the term "security" is in
order. Despite its continuous invocation in public life, the concept remains
slippery and surprisingly under-theorized. As Jeremy Waldron writes,
"[a]lthough we know that 'security' is a vague and ambiguous concept, and
though we should suspect that its vagueness is a source of danger when
talk of trade-offs is in the air, still there has been little or no attempt in the
literature of legal and political theory to bring any sort of clarity to the
concept., 30 As a general matter, security refers to protection from those
threats that imperil survival-both of the individual and of a given
society's collective institutions or way of life. At its broadest, these threats
are multidimensional and can result from phenomena as wide-ranging as
environmental disasters or food shortages. Thus, political actors with
divergent ideological commitments defend the often competing goals of
social security, economic security, financial security, collective security,
human security, food security, environmental security, and-the
granddaddy of them all-national security. But for the purposes of this
Article, when invoked without any modifier, the word security refers to
24 See

Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme Court

Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 193, 202 (2002) (noting that Justice Frankfurter believed that
"[p]ublic-mindedness was the obligation attendant to one's rise in the meritocracy. The expertise and
elite status achieved in reward for surviving the competition of the educational system was to be used
to prepare the way for other entrants.") (quoting G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
TRADITION 326-27 (1976)).
2 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
26320 U.S. 81 (1943).
27 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
29 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).

30See Waldron, supra note 3, at 456 (criticizing the lack of attempts to clarify the meaning of
"security").
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more specific questions of common defense and physical safety. These
questions, emphasizing issues of war and peace, are largely coterminous
with what Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously referred to in his "Four
Freedoms" State of the Union Address as "freedom from fear:" namely
ensuring that citizens are protected from external and internal acts of
"physical aggression."'
This definitional choice is meant to serve two connected theoretical
objectives. First, as a conceptual matter it is important to keep the term
security analytically separate from "national security"-a phrase
ubiquitous in current legal and political debate. While on the face of it,
both terms might appear synonymous, national security-as Americans
understand it today-is in fact a relatively novel concept, which took hold
discursively in the mid twentieth century as a particular vision of how to
address issues of common defense and personal safety. Thus national
security embodies only one of a number of competing theoretical and
historical approaches to matters of external violence and warfare. Second,
and relatedly, it has become a truism in political philosophy that the
concept of liberty is plural and multifaceted.32 In other words, different
ideals of liberty presuppose distinct visions of political life and possibility.
Yet far less attention has been paid to the fact that security is similarly a
plural concept, embodying divergent assumptions about social ordering. In
fact, competing notions of security-by offering different answers to the
question of "who decides?"-can be more or less compatible with
democratic ideals. If anything, the problem of the contemporary moment
is the dominance of a security concept that systematically challenges those
sociological and normative assumptions required to sustain popular
involvement in matters of threat and safety.
II. SECURITY AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION
In order to appreciate just how plural the concept of security has been
historically, it is helpful to begin by describing key alternatives in the
philosophical canon. These alternatives are most systematically articulated
in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the two figures most
central to the development of Anglo-American political thought. Both
thinkers saw the goal of security as the primary impetus for individuals to
31 President

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 6, 1941), available at

http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/fdr-the-four-freedoms-speech-text/ ("The fourth is freedom from
fear-which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point
and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical
aggression against any neighbor-anywhere in the world.").
32 For the seminal articulation of the multiple and potentially conflicting meanings of liberty, see
Isaiah Berlin's 1958 lecture, Two Concepts of Liberty, ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121-34 (1969).
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establish civil society, but adopted fundamentally conflicting accounts of
the security knowledge possessed by ordinary citizens-and thus the forms
of political association that best protected people from external threat.
Their alternative approaches to security are worth assessing in detail, as
they provide the conceptual backdrop for making sense of earlier American
legal and political notions of security, especially as embodied in
constitutional text and nineteenth century case law. They also offer
countervailing philosophical approaches to today's dominant perspective.
In the process, these alternatives highlight the extent to which our
contemporary account rests on deeply contested assumptions about
rationality, deliberation, and citizenship.
A. Hobbes, EpistemologicalSkepticism, and DemocraticSecurity
Modem political thought is often presented as beginning with the
debate between Thomas Hobbes and John Locke over the nature of
political government.33 In fact, as Part III will emphasize, the eighteenth
and nineteenth century American approach to security hewed closely to
key elements of the Lockean narrative and questioned the Hobbesian
image of unitary authority. Yet, in distinct ways, each thinker offered a
politics of security more potentially compatible with democratic practice
than what has emerged in recent decades. This might be especially
surprising in the case of Hobbes, given his reputation as the philosopher
par excellence of absolutism.3 4 But unlike with today's pervasive security
concept, Hobbes fundamentally rejected the belief that there existed a
"science" of security, and thus also rejected the view that assertions of elite
expertise could warrant restricting the public's decision-making
responsibilities. Indeed, as we will later see, a remarkable feature of
today's security paradigm is the extent to which it reproduces the
centralizing and hierarchical presumptions of the Hobbesian account, while
deemphasizing those components that for Hobbes nonetheless sustained
33This view has been presented by individuals as ideologically diverse as conservative
philosopher Leo Strauss in NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 165-66, 202, 248-51 (1953) and Marxist
philosopher C.B. Macpherson in THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO

LOCKE 237-41 (1962). In the American context, the argument grounds Louis Hartz's famous account
of U.S. political life as marked by a "Lockean consensus." See Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE
REVOLUTION 140-41 (1955) (explaining the dominion of Lockean principles in American political
life); see also KANN, supra note 18, at 12 ("Hartz's Lockean consensus, then, refers to a tacit contract
among American men to act as if the individual search for wealth was the meaning of life, liberty, and

happiness.").
34 See Sharon A. Lloyd & Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes 's Moral and PoliticalPhilosophy, STANF.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (FEB. 12, 2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral (last updated
Aug. 23, 2008) ("[Hobbes] is infamous for having used the social contract method to arrive at the
astonishing conclusion that we ought to submit to the authority of an absolute-undivided and

unlimited-sovereign power.").
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popular accountability. For this reason alone, revisiting his vision of
security is deeply instructive for the present moment.
Hobbes began by positing that individuals exist in a state of nature
prior to the construction of civil society.35 Due to the conflicts and
insecurities that bedevil this original position, individuals develop a social
contract and with it governmental arrangements. 36 The necessity and
structure of these arrangements ultimately derive from assumptions
Hobbes made about the nature of human reason and its implications for
collective life. Hobbes contended that, as an epistemological matter, we
can possess no definitive knowledge regarding the external world around
us. He presented this argument in part by questioning the traditional
Aristotelian conception of colors. Rather than being essential qualities of
objects, colors are merely those images reflected back to us through the
sensory organ of the eye.3 s We have no knowledge of what an object
really looks like, only its sensory appearance. Yet, despite this rejection of
natural essences, Hobbes did claim that we know that the external world
exists as such.38 He reached this conclusion based on the fact that humans
experience change. People do not apprehend a static image of the world,
but rather a series of constantly shifting images, thoughts, noises, and
tactile sensations. This indicates that there exists some "matter" 39 in the
world, which is in a constant state of motion. The world that we apprehend
is the result of this external material acting upon our sensory organs and
thus causing our perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. Hobbes wrote, "[s]o
that sense in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused (as I have
said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our
eyes, ears, and other organs .... ,40
For Hobbes, this epistemological skepticism, presented through an
account of colors, leads to far reaching conclusions about human
experience and how individuals interact in the state of nature. Above all, it
means that while all human beings seek self-preservation, their ability to
35For a summary of Hobbes's conceptions of the state of nature, see Lloyd & Sreedhar, supra

note 17.
36
Id. ("When people mutually covenant each to the others to obey a common authority, they have
established what Hobbes calls 'sovereignty by institution.' When, threatened by a conqueror, they
covenant for protection by promising obedience, they have established 'sovereignty by acquisition.'
These are equally legitimate ways of establishing sovereignty, according to Hobbes, and their
underlying motivation is the same---namely fear-whether of one's fellows or of a conqueror.").
37 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 6-7 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (1668) (describing how the
human body and mind subjectively interpret the surrounding world).
38 This is in contrast to Ren6 Descartes, who famously took as his philosophical starting point a
position of extreme doubt regarding the existence of the world itself and then set out to establish a firm
basis for objective knowledge.

RENt DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON

FIRST PHILOSOPHY 18-22 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 4th ed. 1998) (1637).
39 HOBBES, supranote 37, at 20.
40
Id. at7.

2012]

WHO DECIDES ON SECURITY?

establish definitively what enhances or decreases their security is deeply
Since individuals possess no authoritative knowledge
circumscribed.
regarding the character of the external world, they reach different and often
contradictory conclusions about what may pose a threat to their physical
safety. What makes this informational uncertainty even more problematic
is that humans possess no shared moral faculty, deriving either from God
or nature itself, which could produce consensus and cooperation.
According to Hobbes, our moral language is inexorably subject to the same
illusions as those that confound our general awareness of the world around
us. In The Elements of Law, he wrote:
Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth,
and is delightful to himself, GOOD; and that EVIL which
displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth
from other in constitution, they differ also one from
another concerning the common distinction of good and
evil. Nor is there any such thing as.. . simply good.4'
Views of the good are idiosyncratic; they are the product of an emotional
and psychological makeup whose subjective preferences are different in
every human being.42 The result is that in the state of nature we have no
basis by which to convince others of the good, since what might please one
person may in fact harm another. As a consequence, for Hobbes the most
dangerous threats to insecurity are ultimately moral disagreements over
good and evil itself. These disagreements, combined with our difficulties
perceiving the sources and meaning of various threats, reduce the state of
nature to one of war. Such warfare is not only marked by moments of
actual violence but by a pervasive condition of fear and uncertainty. 43
Without a common moral framework or the capacity to judge events
properly, a Hobbesian state of nature embodies a permanent crisis
"wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and
their own invention shall furnish them withal." 44
For Hobbes, our lack of knowledge directly implies the political need
for absolutism. In submitting to the common authority of the Leviathan,
all individuals give up their private right to decide questions of
preservation and security and instead choose to accept the opinions of the
41THOMAS HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO 44 (J.C.A. Gaskin trans. &

ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1650).
42 As political theorist Richard Tuck writes, in Hobbes's view our interpretations of good and evil
are analogous to our perception of color. These interpretations are simply the product of external
matter acting upon us, creating a "system of passions and wants which make up the human emotive
psychology." See RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES 53 (1989).
43Lloyd & Sreedhar, supra note 34.
44HOBBES, supra note 37, at 76.
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sovereign. Individuals are willing to make this substitution because, as
they have no certainty about the world themselves, they also have no basis
to question the accuracy of the sovereign's judgments. In fact, precisely
since war is the result of epistemological disagreements (regarding what
might be dangerous, what constitutes good and evil, or how to divide
material spoils), having a single and final arbiter transforms the natural
condition of endemic fear and conflict into a civil one of security.
According to Hobbes, the decisions of the Leviathan therefore establish
what citizens accept as the "rules of propriety (or meum and tuum) and of
good, evil, lawful, and unlawful., 45 In other words, property allocations,
moral valuations, and justice claims have no content beyond the
determinations of civil government. In fact, even what constitutes a
"person" is ultimately the artificial determination of the sovereign, since
the definition of a "human being" is grounded not in any shared
knowledge, but rather in opinion and conjecture. Hobbes writes that,
"upon the occasion of some strange and deformed birth, it shall not be
decided by Aristotle,
or the philosophers, whether the same be a man or no,
46
but by the laws.'
This radical uncertainty means that for Hobbes, politics must be
framed around a centralized and unlimited power. In order to impose
moral consensus and to choose definitively among competing accounts of
harm, the Leviathan has to possess a single and undivided will-one
unconstrained by constitutional checks. Moreover, as individuals do not
have the ability to assess the appropriateness of sovereign actions-unless
the state is actually trying to kill or clearly endanger the particular
citizen-he or she has no basis to resist or critique this established order.
In essence, the lack of knowledge undermines those justifications one
might offer for a politics of dissent or of legal limitation. In Hobbes's
account, since our original condition is one of continuous crisis and
rational uncertainty, a centralized regime (regardless of the potential costs)
is still at root preferable to endemic insecurity.
But if Hobbes is considered to be the foremost Anglo-American
theorist of absolutism, commentators have paid far less attention to the
surprisingly democratic implications of his security politics. 47 At the same
time as he defends unitary authority, Hobbes's view of knowledge also
opens the door to expansive popular involvement in collective decision4

1

47

Id.at 114.
HOBBES, supranote 37, at 181.
See,

e.g.,

MICHAEL

C.

WILLIAMS,

THE

REALIST

TRADITION

AND

THE

LIMITS

OF

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20 (2005). Williams maintains that "Hobbes' state of nature is designed

to illustrate the relationship between knowledge, belief, and the social construction of action." Id.
From that starting point, Williams argues that Hobbes' epistemological skepticism (his account of the
constraints on knowledge and rationality) place important, and perhaps counterintuitive, checks on the
Leviathan's actual coerciveness in political life. Id. at 21-28.
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making. This is because his epistemology is fundamentally egalitarian and
thoroughly rejects any distinction between elite and ordinary rationality.
Hobbes's skepticism implies that security knowledge eludes all
individuals, regardless of social position, education, military background,
or class standing. In effect, no science or expertise of security exists, one
which would independently legitimize particular determinations of danger.
The sovereign's judgments about preservation are thus qualitatively
indistinct from those reached by the average person; they are simply
opinions that we as members of the polity allow to gain the force of law.
This suggests that the Leviathan need not be organized around a single
executive or specialized body of decision-makers; such entities have no
unique or higher knowledge. For Hobbes, the choice between forms of
government was merely a "difference of convenience. ' 48 State authority
can be placed legitimately in an all-powerful democratic legislature-in
one "assembly of men"--so long as that assembly "reduce[s] all their
wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will...."49
As security is in everyone's interest and no one possesses any
heightened capacity to discern how best to achieve it, the public as a whole
rightfully can participate in full deliberation and decision-making--even if
the final decision may ultimately curtail the public's freedom of action.
Popular opinions are no better or worse than those of executives or
aristocratic bodies. For Hobbes, security claims about threat are ultimately
complex and ideologically infused opinions rather than established truths;
they are inevitably subject to debate and disagreement. Thus, without a
technical proof of what would constitute security, Hobbes views it as
perfectly acceptable for security judgments and practices to emerge
through democratic discussion-with the one caveat that the assembly's
choice be taken as absolute.
B. Locke and the Choice Between "Pole-Cats" and "Lions"
In many ways, Locke's views were a response to Hobbes's unitary
theory of government and his belief that the state of nature was one of
endemic and continuous threats, bereft of any discernible moral
principles.5 ° In the process, Locke offered a competing vision of how
popular accountability could be wedded to the project of securing
collective life, one that promoted constitutional checks and challenged
unlimited authority in any form. By combining popular consent with
limited government, Locke's security vision provided the philosophical
48 HOBBES, supra note 37, at 120.
49

Id. at 109.

50 See Lloyd & Sreedhar, supra note 34 (discussing how the state of nature can be seen as a state

of war and conflict).
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framework for both the Federal Constitution and early American
judgments about the appropriate role of ordinary citizens in issues of war
and peace.51
Like Hobbes, Locke commenced his discussion of politics by positing
a state of nature in which individuals exist prior to civil society, and goes
on to highlight the insecurities that then generate a social contract. 52 As a
result, he too underscored the priority of security for political life and
viewed civil society as the product of our search for such security.53 What
differentiates Locke from his predecessor is a fundamental disagreement
about rationality and human knowledge in the state of nature. Unlike
Hobbes, Locke argued that human beings are endowed by God with a
faculty of reason.54 This capacity allows individuals to apprehend and
follow foundational laws that operate in the state of nature even before the
construction of government. The central law is that due to our shared
rationality, all people are "equal and independent, [and] no one ought to
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions .... In addition,
it also indicates that we have property in ourselves, and a natural right to
life, liberty, and estate.
What follows from Locke's analysis is the existence of moral claims
prior to politics. Rather than property, justice, and good and evil being the
product of political choices made by governmental decision-makers in civil
society, these terms are natural and have a universally accessible content.
For Locke, reason provides us the ability to apprehend the existence of
God whose "workmanship ' 56 we are, to know good from evil, and to
arbitrate disputes with justice and equanimity. Given these assumptions
about human knowledge, the Lockean state of nature is therefore primarily
a state of calm, which is only occasionally interrupted by violence. It is
pointedly not the condition of endemic danger depicted by Hobbes. Since
people understand the distinction between right and wrong, a moral
consensus often prevails that limits discord and generally prevents the slide
toward conflict. Moreover, the primary threats to security that individuals
face are encroachments on their private property.
While these
51See Donald L. Doemberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective ConstitutionalRights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 52, 52 (1985) (commenting on how John
Locke's ideas of consent influenced the framers of the United States Constitution); Alex Tuckness,
Locke's

Political

Philosophy,

STANF.

ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF

PHIL.

(Nov.

9,

2005),

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political (last updated July 29, 2010) (discussing Locke's
argument that if the government ignores the rights of the people, the people have the right to take back
power from the government).
. 52

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15-16 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub.

Co. 1980) (1690).
53
1d. at 16.
14Id. at 9.
55Id.
56id.
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encroachments have the potential to pose serious obstacles to physical
safety-by erupting into violence-they are usually readily addressed
within the state of nature. This is because most people know the sources of
their insecurity (i.e., a neighbor claiming ownership over your land) as well
as how best to settle these disputes. Problems of security are ultimately no
different qualitatively than any other issue, and no specialized expertise or
information is required to address them.
Nonetheless, given that all individuals in the state of nature have the
right to be judges in their own case,5 7 inconveniences inevitably emerge
due to confusion and disorder. Without a common authority, disputesagain mostly over property rather than religious or ideological beliefwhich could be readily arbitrated have the potential to fester and
compromise general expectations of security. Locke argued that these
difficulties are pervasive enough to require the establishment of
government:
[C]ivil government is the proper remedy for the
inconveniences of the state of nature, which must certainly
be great, where men may be judges in their own case,
since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust
as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to
condemn himself for it ....
Yet, even if these problems justify the creation of a common magistrate,
they also suggest limits on the mode of power that would be legitimate. In
particular, the reality of general moral consensus and widespread security
knowledge-which exist prior to politics-lead Locke to reject Hobbesian
absolutism or a centralized legislative and executive authority as an
acceptable solution. First, absolutism does not generate civil society but
rather reproduces a state of nature, because while everyone else submits to
a common judge, the sovereign remains as judge in his or her own case.
And, since any individual who may have a dispute with the sovereign has
no alternative power to appeal to, the natural condition reemerges. Locke
wrote, "where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to
appeal to ... there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is
every absoluteprince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.'5 9
More important for our purposes, Locke also argued that the popular
capacity to understand and respond to security threats suggests that

"7Id.at 12.
58Id.
'9 Id.

at 48.
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individuals can gauge the relative intensity of competing dangers. 60 Thus,
leaving-,the state of nature (in which all are judges in their own case) to
enter political absolutism is choosing the worse of two evils. Locke
dismissed the Hobbesian solution by commenting:
[A]s if when men quitting the state of nature ... agreed
that all of them but one[] should be under the restraint of
laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the
state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious
by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that
they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them
by pole-cats, orfoxes; but are content, nay, think it safety,
to be devoured by lions.6 1
At the heart of this argument is a claim about the relationship for ordinary
individuals between interests and knowledge, one directly contradictory to
Hobbes's assumption about epistemological uncertainty. Locke implied
that people do not simply know that maintaining a condition of security is
in their self-interest. They also are able to recognize the most appropriate
means to overcome violence and thus determine which specific
governmental structures or political decisions actually contradict their
basic interests. Therefore, the capacity to distinguish between threats
posed by "pole-cats" and by "lions" not only questions the legitimacy of
absolutism, it also provides a rationale for collective and shared
deliberation. Precisely because we know best the causes of our own
insecurity, we should have a say in generating the policies aimed at
alleviating these inconveniences.
The democratic implications of Locke's account of knowledge and
security are often obscured in the scholarly literature because of his
parallel claims in the Second Treatise about executive prerogative.62
Locke argued that once in civil society, unexpected "accidents and
necessities' '63 may occur requiring immediate and flexible action. Since
60 See

id at 66 ("[T]he enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very

unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and
continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with
others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives,
liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.").
61Id. at 50.
62 See, e.g., MARK NEOCLEOUS, CRITIQUE OF SECURITY 7-8 (2008). In this fine book, Neocleous
nonetheless problematically presents the Lockean concept as the intellectual foundation of the modem
security framework by focusing too exclusively on his arguments about prerogative. He describes the
book's thesis as "trac[ing] security politics back into Locke's account of prerogative and then
expand[ing] this into a wider set of claims about liberalism and security." Id.
63 LOCKE, supranote 52, at 84.

WHO DECIDES ON SECURITY.

2012]

legislatures are "usually too numerous, and so too slow'6 4 to address fully
these moments of crisis, the executive branch enjoys a discretionary
authority in such circumstances "to do many things of choice which the
laws do not prescribe."6' This expansive extra-legal authority no doubt
runs contrary to the politics of limited government, which Locke so
carefully establishes elsewhere.66 Yet, the effects of prerogative power on
collective life should not be exaggerated. To begin with, if the state of
nature is primarily a state of calm punctuated by moments of insecurity,
civil society is even closer to a condition of peace. Due to rationality and
moral consensus, crisis is far from the normal order and therefore the times
in which executives exercise prerogative power are necessarily limited.
Just as crucial, individual knowledge means that publics hold the
capacity to determine the appropriateness of prerogative action and to
recognize when executive judgments compromise rather than enhance their
interests.67 It is this capacity-to appreciate when governmental actions
are contrary to basic security-that in particularly egregious circumstances
can justify revolution. Locke saw prerogative power as the occasional
emergence of the state of nature within civil society, since during these
moments of crisis "no judge on earth',68 exists to adjudicate independently
popular opposition to the use of discretion. He argued that when publics
believe their security to be compromised fundamentally by executive
decisions, they have no alternative political recourse and the only possible
remedy is an "appeal to heaven.'6 9 This appeal is ultimately a call to
God-and in particular those God-given laws of nature-to justify the
rejection of earthly political authority.70 Given his belief that the public
has the right to determine the legitimacy of executive action, Locke's
claims about prerogative are actually consistent with his larger views about
security and knowledge. They reinforce-rather than contradict-the
ability of ordinary citizens to understand and appropriately pursue their
interests in matters of preservation and survival.
6 Id.
65 Id.

6 For instance, in his account of the establishment of civil society, Locke famously stated that
legitimate government requires that "no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it" and
thus enjoy freedom from the checks placed against absolutism. LOCKE, supranote 52, at § 94.
67 Locke wrote of uses of prerogative which contradict the public good: "rulers, in such attempts,
exercising a power the people never put into their hands, (who can never be supposed to consent that
any body should rule over them for their harm) do that which they have not a right to do." LOCKE,
supranote 52, at 87.
68 id.
69 Id.

70As Locke remarked, "it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another, as to give

him a liberty to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to neglect
his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another power to
take it." Id. at 88.
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Ultimately, both Hobbes and Locke contended that all human beings
enjoy the same epistemological position, one marked either by a
thoroughgoing lack of security knowledge or instead by widespread
rationality and understanding. For Locke, such understanding not only
justifies popular accountability, but it also protects against the tyranny
wrought by government discretion, whether exercised by a unitary
executive or by an all-powerful and democratic assembly. As will be
discussed in Parts IV and V, today's security orientation rejects the
philosophical thread shared by both thinkers-the egalitarian belief that all
individuals possess the same skills in discerning and responding to external
danger. By sustaining a divide between elite and popular capacities,
today's orientation holds on to the most troubling aspects of the Hobbesian
narrative (its vision of endemic threat and its skepticism of constraints on
state power) while casting aside the elements in both thinkers that promote
popular participation and widespread self-rule.
III. LOCKEAN RATIONALITY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
The philosophical positions of Hobbes and Locke not only shaped the
development of modern political thought, but also provided the intellectual
context for early American debates about the meaning and implications of
security. In fact, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, dominant
American assumptions about the relationship between security and
knowledge fundamentally mirrored the classic Lockean account and would
be a far cry from today's principal approach. Indeed, figures as politically
opposed as Abraham Lincoln and U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger
Taney nonetheless held the same basic belief that individuals by and large
understood the causes of their insecurity as well as the appropriate methods
for responding to threats. Moreover, such figures presupposed that a
general moral consensus existed, which created a collective framework for
conceiving of questions of property and justice. To the extent that early
Americans disagreed, it usually had less to do with knowledge claims and
far more with whether the mass of laborers had the virtue to think in terms
of this collective moral framework rather than their own partisan interests;
the issue was one ofjudgment as opposed to technical expertise.
This Part focuses on constitutional debates at two key moments in the
early republic in order to highlight how Lockean beliefs about popular
rationality structured security practices and institutions. Section A first
explores how views about security knowledge set the terms for the
Constitution's initial distribution of war-making and common defense
powers between executive and legislative branches. Section B then details
how courts in the mid nineteenth century assessed questions of emergency.
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This discussion pays particular attention to Mitchell v. Harmony,7I a case
from the Mexican-American War which is among the most sustained legal
explorations in the early republic of (1) what constitutes an emergency; (2)
who decides whether one exists; and (3) which departures from
constitutional normalcy are legally justified.72
A. Abundance, Insularity,and the Founders' Constitution
To appreciate fully the meaning of constitutional debates regarding
security and executive power during the founding period, it is critical to
A central and irreversible
recognize the political circumstances.
consequence of the Revolution was a process by which the hierarchical
character of colonial life faced intense pressure from below. Both the
conflict with Britain and the larger project of independence made
merchants and landed gentry militarily and politically dependent on small
farmers.73 In this context, historian Robert Wiebe described the 1770s and
1780s as a period of rising egalitarian commitments, marked by the
diffusion of political control and the creation of "[a] multitude of small
political units, governmental and quasi-governmental, [which] rushed to
fill the vacuum of British authority, [and] resisted the pulls from patriot
Such
capitals almost as stubbornly as they resisted the British ...
decentralization, coupled with the social emergence of less affluent
settlers, meant that politics in the late eighteenth century was characterized
by an impressive degree of public assertiveness-through elections,
petitions, protests, and even outright rebellion.75
No doubt gentry and commercial elites found many of these
7 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
72 Id. at

133-37.

73See Merrill Jensen, The American Revolution and American Agriculture, 43 AGRIC. HIST. 107,

107, 120 (1969) ("American society at the outbreak of the American Revolution was an
overwhelmingly agricultural society with perhaps ninety percent of a population of two and a half
million people living on farms and plantations, and the remaining ten percent living in small towns and
The farmers of
the few urban centers, dependent upon the American farmers for their well being ....
the middle states had been far more prosperous in prewar days than those of New England, and this
continued to be the case after the war. In two states they had achieved considerable political strength as
a result of the Revolution.").
74 ROBERT H.

WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE

CONSTITUTION TO THE EVE OF DISUNION 3 (1984); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 245, 258 (1992) ("[Pjopular and pluralist [political] representation was
only the fulfillment of the localist tendencies of public life that went back to the seventeenth-century
beginnings of American history. . . . American society could no longer be thought of as either a
In such a pluralistic egalitarian society
hierarchy of ranks or a homogeneous republican whole ....
there was no possibility of a liberal enlightened elite speaking for the whole ... ").
75 For detailed discussions of two of the era's most notorious popular uprisings, the Shays
Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion, see generally DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION: THE
MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1980), and THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER,
REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986).
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developments deeply troubling, and wariness of popular power-and its
perceived instability-played a key role in the institutional move to the
new Federal Constitution.76
James Madison famously remarked in
Federalist No. 55 that, "[h]ad every Athenian citizen been a Socrates,
every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. 77 In his view,
"avoid[ing] the confusion and intemperance of a multitude' 78 meant
creating a detached national government that divided sovereignty across
multiple branches and ensured that there existed governmental checks on
the actions of poor citizens.79 Yet, even these gentry elites appreciated
how the political terrain had been fundamentally altered by Revolution. In
keeping with the pervasive sentiment of the era, the Constitution's framers
took for granted that the new political community would have to be
grounded in the democratic principle of majority rule and thus expand the
domain of meaningful control beyond powerful families and landed
interests. Such participatory politics presumed that ordinary citizens
broadly knew their interests as well as how to achieve them. Moreover,
there were no political matters appropriately closed off to determination by
majority rule or which required technical knowledge beyond what farmers
and artisans gained through shared and common social experiences. In
other words, politics was properly a matter of popular judgment rather than
specialized expertise. Madison and others clearly questioned the wisdom
of such faith and hoped to establish new frameworks that, as Bruce
Ackerman notes, "economize[d] on virtue" by creating political bodies
with overlapping responsibilities.8 0 Still, the founders assumed that, at
root, collective choices would have to rest on popular judgment and
deliberation-if for no other reason than the realities of mass political
pressure.
As a result, the Constitution consistently affirmed the belief that
fundamental social decisions (particularly those relating to common
defense) were best made through broad and open public discussion,
placing ultimate authority in democratic legislatures. Such legislatures,
76

See, e.g., AZtZ RANA, THE Two FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 131-42 (2010) (describing

how the shift to the new Federal Constitution was precipitated in part by elite fears, especially in the
context of the Shays' Rebellion, of the consequences of increased popular participation).
77THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 283 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
79Id.
79THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the advantages of representative
government in preventing the rise of divisive factions within the public); see also RANA, supra note 76,
at 138 ("Madison's model of divided sovereignty, in which the creation of a truly national government
insulated statecraft from mass interests and thus divisive social conflict, emerged as the primary
theoretical framework for the new federal Constitution.").
so I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS

198-99 (1991)

(emphasis omitted)

(discussing how The Federalist Papers propose a constitutional structure that distinguishes
constitutional and normal politics, fosters deliberation among elected officials and the public, and
provides space for judicial review).
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grounded in majoritarian rule, were viewed as closest to approximating
both the interests and the will of the populace writ large. No less than
Alexander Hamilton, among the founders the most suspicious of laboring
class opinion and influence, underscored in FederalistNo. 69 the role of
both participation and majoritarian decision-making in matters of war and
peace. As Hamilton wrote, while the prerogative of the British King
"extend[ed] to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of
fleets and armies . . . by the Constitution under consideration, [these
judgments] would appertain to the legislature.'
Indeed, not only did
Article I of the Constitution give Congress, not the President, the power to
declare war,8 2 it provided
Congress with the responsibility of raising both
84
3
the army 8 and the navy.
Just as important, the legislative branch also enjoyed primary federal
responsibility in directing the militias. 85 During the early republic, in
keeping with Lockean suspicions of insulated and elite control in security
matters, widespread hostility existed toward professional standing armies;
they were famously described by Virginia Congressman John Randolph
"as 'mercenaries' and 'ragamuffins.' 86 The broad belief was that standing
armies only served to promote the rise of military despotism. As a result,
militia service was seen as essential to safeguarding republican
government, because such service was largely coextensive with both
voting rights and full membership. 87 It constituted perhaps the key
mechanism by which ordinary citizens participated on a regular basis in
questions of war and peace. Although the states controlled militia training
and officer appointment, Congress was empowered to determine how best
to "organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]" the militias, as well as how to
81THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supranote 77, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton).
82

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.

Ild. cl. 12.
MId. cl. 13.
85

1d. cl. 15.

86 LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 262

n.43 (1978) (quoting 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 305 (1800)).
87See id. at 261-64 (describing the early Republican belief that "a militia of independent
freeholders was the backbone of a republic"). Historian Lance Banning powerfully captured founding
era judgments about the evils of a standing army and the value of militia service. As he wrote of
Randolph's speech:

I know of no better example of the persistence of the idea that the militia is the
agency through which freemen express their virtue in arms than the famous
speech [of] John Randolph of Roanoke .... Gentlemen who raise alarms against
foreign dangers should listen to warnings "against standing armies-against
destroying the military spirit of the citizen by cultivating it only in the soldier by
profession, against an institution which has wrought the downfall of every free
state and riveted the fetters of despotism."
Id. at 262 n.43 (quoting 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 300 (1800)).
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"govern[] such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the
United States ... ,,88 This authority vis-A-vis the militias thus emphasizes
the larger constitutional commitment to majoritarian supremacy in matters
of common defense. Moreover, the importance of militia service and the
collective wariness of a professional army also highlight the prevailing
opinion of the time: meaningful security was undermined-not
enhanced-when removed from the purview of the wider public.
In fact, this security faith in majoritarianism did not stop with the
distant federal government; it went so far as to incorporate state
legislatures as well. Article 1V of the Constitution, which guaranteed to
the states protection by the federal government against invasion and
insurrection, gave local legislatures, rather than state governors or national
officials, the primary authority to assess whether problems of "domestic
[v]iolence" justified federal involvement. 89 During the revolutionary and
post-revolutionary period, these legislatures were often the institutional
entities most dominated by poorer voices and therefore a critical space for
the expression of an immediate and unchecked popular will.9a Their
involvement in basic determinations of internal threat, especially viewed in
conjunction with the centrality of militia service to political life, further
reaffirm how assumptions about popular responsibility structured
founding-era security practices.
Part of what made elites willing to accept the rise of mass political
involvement were background beliefs about the social conditions marking
eighteenth century America. In particular, gentry and commercial elites
believed that the new republic enjoyed the benefit of relative economic
abundance and physical isolation from the dangers that marked European
imperial rivalries. According to Thomas Jefferson, one of the primary
sources of insecurity and social disorder was material scarcity and the
conflicts over goods that it generated. When individuals did not possess
land or the material resources required for their own subsistence chaos
inevitably ensued. 9' In his view, this scarcity was the cause of much of
Europe's political instability, where "[t]he mobs of great cities add just so
88U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. For more on congressional control of the federal military and the
militias in particular, see Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120
YALE L.J. 1084, 1095-97 (2011).
89U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The relevant section reads: "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence." Id.
90For more on the populist role of state legislatures during the era, see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS,
LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 60-97 (1993).

91See Thomas Jefferson, The Present State of Manufactures, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MANUFACTURES 15, 17 (Michael Brewster Folsom & Steven D. Lubar eds., 1982) ("Dependance [sic]
begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of
ambition.").
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much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the
human body., 92 By contrast, citizens in colonial and postcolonial America
enjoyed agricultural abundance and easy access to property, a condition
that would persist "as long as there shall be vacant lands in any part of
America., 93 He believed that if property continued to be widely available
to most settlers, society would remain in a state of relative peace with
individuals securely possessing the means essential to self-preservation.
Aiding such tranquility was the fact that Americans were largely
isolated from Europe and its internecine conflicts. In FederalistNo. 8,
Hamilton argued that on the continent military despotism and centralized
executive authority were inevitable because "[t]he perpetual menacings of
danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it."'94 Facing
continuous emergency, Hamilton wrote of European politics:
The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The
inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are
unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their
rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights;
and by degrees the people are brought to consider the
soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their
superiors. 95
By contrast, American insulation, dramatically aided by the barrier of
the Atlantic Ocean, meant that as long as the republic did not fracture
internally, its external position would be one of calm---perfectly
compatible with the maintenance of both popular and civil authority. As
Hamilton concluded, "Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies
in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in
strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military
96
establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.,
Thus for both Jefferson and his later political nemesis Hamilton,
Americans had ready access to the means necessary for long-term security
and therefore collective life was principally one of presumptive peaceonly occasionally interrupted by violence and warfare. This indicated that
for those elite voices like Hamilton, most skeptical of political self-rule by
ordinary citizens, an accommodation with majority rule appeared far less
politically dangerous. The lack of absolute destitution suggested that
92

1d. at 17.

93Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 360,

363 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999).
94THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
95
d.at 70.
96
Id.at71.
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popular judgments were not likely to be as prone to extremism or to attacks
on propertied interests. And the fact that emergency or crisis was an
extraordinary rather than a normal condition of politics indicated that
greater space existed for possible error in public deliberation. Since the
potential consequences for survival were less severe, poor collective
judgment, if simply an occasional occurrence, did not necessarily bring
with it widespread social collapse. These assumptions of insulation and
abundance, taken alongside the general commitment to popular knowledge
and decision-making, suggested a political environment remarkably similar
to that outlined by Locke. In particular, institutional frameworks took for
granted that most citizens had the capacity to understand security threats
and to respond appropriately to them. Moreover, since these threats were
relatively infrequent, citizens were unlikely to be willing to transfer
meaningful decision-making responsibility to centralized and authoritarian
forms of government, or to address the inconveniences caused by "polecats" by allowing themselves to be devoured by "lions."
B. Democratic Intelligence, Jacksonian Populism, and Mitchell v.
Harmony
If elites during the founding era retained some concern about mass
opinion and the potential pitfalls of majoritarian politics, subsequent
generations increasingly deemphasized these worries. Particularly during
and after the Jacksonian period, politicians and social critics questioned the
view that property-less citizens were any more liable than wealthy elites to
think in terms of partial self-interest rather than the common good.97 In
fact, a quick snapshot of the mid-nineteenth century underscores how
political and legal figures across the ideological spectrum argued that-if
anything--collective life should be marked by the thorough
democratization of intelligence. Individuals as diverse as Lincoln and
Taney saw the incipient rise of industrialization and new professional
occupations as posing a potential threat to popular self-government. In
their opinion, if most citizens did not have the information and knowledge
to understand their social condition, they similarly would be unable to
fulfill their primary functions as participatory citizens. While Madison and
Hamilton may have feared the judgment of less affluent citizens, later
generations instead saw the driving threat to democracy in the social
failure to distribute broadly scientific and cultural information. Under this
reading, to the extent that informational cleavages were reproduced as
97For an extended discussion of democratic leveling and Jacksonian faith in popular capacities
during the mid-nineteenth century, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 189-206 (2004), and SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 312-29, 359-424 (2005).
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group privileges-segmenting society into distinct classes of learning and
labor-these cleavages had to be eliminated. As Jacksonian radical and
social critic Orestes Brownson wrote in the 1840s, "[t]here must not be a
learned class and an unlearned, a cultivated class and
' 98 an uncultivated, a
refined class and a vulgar, a wealthy class and a poor.
Such an account was perhaps most powerfully articulated by Abraham
Lincoln, in his 1859 "Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural
Society." 99 There, he argued that the "mud-sill theory"'0 0 was more than
simply a defense of slavery; it was also a claim about the imprudence of
98ORESTES A. BROWNSON, Our FuturePolicy, in 15 THE WORKS OF ORESTES BROWNSON 113,

124 (Detroit, Thorndike Nourse 1884).
99Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society (Sept. 30, 1859),
available at http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincolnspeeches/fair.htm. Although Lincoln is
well-known for defending executive power during the Civil War, the following discussion (perhaps
counterintuitively) focuses on Lincoln's vision of democratic intelligence rather than on his actions as
President. This is for two principal reasons. First, and most important, his ideas, especially as
highlighted in his "Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society," eloquently captured the
broader spirit of the age. Lincoln's arguments about democratic knowledge and popular capacities
were part of the social fabric of American life at the time and represented the dominant collective
wisdom about knowledge and expertise. Second, although Lincoln's Civil War practices centralized
authority and contradicted constitutional text (such as by unilaterally enlarging the army and navy and
suspending the writ of habeas corpus), these actions were understood to be extreme responses to the
extreme and highly unusual circumstance of massive internal rebellion. They did not signal a new
collective experience of endemic and complex insecurity requiring a permanent extension of executive
and military discretion even during periods of relative calm. Neither Lincoln nor his supporters
believed that it had become necessary to revise fundamentally the basic relationship between the
executive branch and the Constitution or the Lockean presumption that peacetime normalcy was only
occasionally punctuated by extraordinary threat. Indeed, Lincoln took for granted that there would be a
return to constitutional and executive normalcy when the war ended. As will be shown, such
arguments about permanent danger and the need for a new institutional structure would have to wait for
a much later day. For more on Lincoln's measures and thinking as President, see LOuis FISHER,
MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON

TERRORISM 41-70 (2005) (discussing Lincoln's use of military tribunals during the war as well as his
constitutional justifications); ROSSITER, supra note 9, at 223-39 (describing Lincoln's presidency as a
story of government crisis during the Civil War); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH
IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 79-134 (2004)

(chronicling the wartime fate of civil liberties during Lincoln's presidency).
'00
The theory was first expounded by South Carolina Senator James Henry Hammond in a Senate
speech on March 4, 1858. In his speech, Hammond defended slave owning by arguing that all societies
were sustained by having a lower class to engage in menial but essential forms of labor:
In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the
drudgery of life. That is, a class requiring but a low order of intellect and but
little skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, fidelity. Such a class you must have,
or you would not have that other class which leads progress, civilization, and
refinement.
It constitutes the very mud-sill of society and of political
government; and you might as well attempt to build a house in the air, as to build
either the one or the other, except on this mud-sill.
James Henry Hammond, Speech to the United States Senate (Mar. 4, 1858), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4h3439t.html.
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combining cultural and scientific knowledge with ordinary labor.'O° He
declared, "[b]y the 'mud-sill' theory it is assumed that labor and education
are incompatible" and that "the education of laborers, is not only useless,
but pernicious, and dangerous."' 02
Such education enhanced the
intemperance and passions of the multitude, and threatened the capacity of
prudent elites to exercise collective power. Under the mud-sill theory,
Lincoln continued, "it is ... deemed a misfortune that laborers should have
heads at all[,]" which are "regarded as explosive materials, only to be
safely kept in damp places, as far as possible from that peculiar sort of fire
which ignites them."'0 3
According to Lincoln, this belief was premised on "[t]he old general
rule... that educated people did not perform manual labor. They managed
to eat their bread, leaving the toil of producing it to the uneducated."'04 In
sharp contrast, the ideal of democratic self-government took for granted
the value of "universal education[,]"' 0 5 in which all individuals were raised
Lincoln
to the level of deliberative and knowledgeable citizens.
maintained that, "as the Author of man makes every individual with one
head and one pair of hands, it was probably intended that heads and hands
should cooperate as friends; and that that particular head, should direct and
control that particular pair of hands.' 0 6 Emphasizing the need to unite
labor and learning, and to ensure that everyone participate in the practices
of independent ethical judgment at work and in politics, Lincoln
concluded, "each head is the natural guardian, director, and protector of the
hands and mouth inseparably connected with it; and that being so, every
head should be cultivated, and improved, by whatever will add to its
capacity for performing its charge.' ' 10 7 For Lincoln, the democratic hope
was that common education at school and at work would provide everyone
with informational resources to participate on an equal footing in economic
and political life-regardless of class standing. As one Indiana school
101
See Abraham

Lincoln, supra note 99.
id.
103 Id.
104 Id. (internal emphasis omitted).
102

05

1 Id.
106Id
107Id.
Lincoln's evocative language of uniting heads and hands was not unique to him.
Throughout the nineteenth century, educators, moral reformers, and labor activists commonly referred
to creating a "harmony of the head and the hand" as a means for elevating all citizens to the status of
independent moral agents. For instance, as labor unionist and presidential candidate, Eugene V. Debs
continually invoked the same imagery to emphasize that workers were more than just "hands" for a
corporate employer. By combining labor and learning, they had the potential to assert their own
political voice. In speech after speech, Debs declared, "[a] thousand heads have grown for every
thousand pair of hands, a thousand hearts throb in testimony of the unity of heads and hands, and a
thousand souls, though crushed and mangled, burn in protest and are pledged to redeem a thousand

men."

NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST 228 (2d ed. 2007) (quoting

Eugene V. Debs.).
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superintendent noted in 1875, reflecting sentiment that was pervasive at the
time, "[i]f we shall limit the education of the masses, and trust to the
extended education of the few for directive power and skill,
' ' 0 8 we must
expect to be ruled by monopolies, demagogues and partisans.
This faith in mass rationality and commitment to expanding popular
knowledge extended far beyond rhetoric. In fact, it shaped much of the
legal approach to matters of emergency and security during the midSuch an approach emphasized the capacity of
nineteenth century.
deliberative bodies and ordinary citizens to sit in judgment of the
emergency practices of military officers and pointedly rejected the notion
of judicial deference to claims of military necessity. To begin with, as
legal scholar Jules Lobel has written, throughout the period, "executive
officials who departed from legal norms in times of war or emergency
could be liable for damages to individuals who suffered injury due to their
actions."' 0 9 The presumption was that courts would sanction the official
for violations, and later Congress could make the determination about
whether to indemnify based on a judgment that necessity indeed justified
such extra-legal practices. In other words, matters of necessity were not
the exclusive province of executive officials and members of the
professional military. Instead, democratic legislatures enjoyed the power
to assess the appropriateness of measures taken to combat perceived
threats.11 0
Indeed, nineteenth century courts went much further and held that even
the initial determination of whether security threats rose to the level of an
emergency did not require any unique expertise or institutional
specialization-it was a question that ordinary citizens could and should
reasonably determine. In Mitchell v. Harmony, a case concerning the
seizure during the Mexican-American War of private property by a U.S.
military colonel named David Mitchell, the Supreme Court provided
perhaps its most extensive and direct examination of this issue."' In the
108SALVATORE, supra note 107, at 10 (quoting

Eugene V. Debs).
109Jules Lobel, Comment, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385,
1394 (1989).
110
As Lobel describes, this process played out in various well-known cases. Id. at 1394-95. For

instance, in Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804), the Supreme Court imposed
individual liability on a naval commander who violated congressional statute by obeying a presidential
directive during the Quasi-War with France. And following the War of 1812, Andrew Jackson
similarly faced a federal fine of $1,000 for his actions taken during military occupation of New Orleans
following his victory over Britain. Id. at 1394. For more on the episode, see Abraham D. Sofaer,
Emergency Power and the Hero of New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 245-51 (1981). As for an
additional example where the Supreme Court imposed a fine on an executive official irrespective of
claims to necessity, see The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 378 (1824).
11 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 136 (1851). The great nineteenth century
counterweight to the Mitchell ruling is generally considered to be Justice Robert Grier's majority
opinion for a five-to-four court in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). The decision upheld
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case, the colonel's basic defense was that he should not face liability
because his actions were taken due to a military emergency, and,
moreover, that he had secret information that the person whose property
was seized planned to carry on illegal trade across enemy lines. H2 In his
ruling on behalf of the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney rejected these
claims and presented a robust Jacksonian defense of popular knowledge
and participation in issues of security. 113
Today, Taney is most famous, or rather infamous, for his opinion in

the constitutionality of the President's decision, in the days following the attack on Fort Sumter, to
pursue a naval blockade of the seceding states even though Congress remained in recess. There, Grier
stated that the initial determination of whether to use defensive force-and how much force was
required--to "suppress[] an insurrection . . . [were] question[s] to be decided by him [the President],
and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted." Id. at 670. Grier's opinion has been used extensively
by government lawyers in the post-9/11 context to defend the notion that the Constitution has long
granted the executive extreme deference on issues of war and peace. See Louis Fisher, The Law: John
Yoo and the Republic, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 177, 189 (2011) (describing the persistent invocation
by John Yoo and other lawyers in the Bush-era Office of Legal Counsel of The Prize Cases as
precedent for wide-ranging unilateral executive action).
Yet, the use of The Prize Cases as setting forth a general constitutional theory of emergency
powers is deeply mistaken. The issue at stake in the case was whether seizures taken before Congress
finally sat in session and asserted its legislative war power were valid prizes. The problem of how far
the President's unilateral authority extended, and thus whether Lincoln could on his own initiative
pursue a blockade even after Congress passed relevant legislation, was not directly at issue. In fact, in
oral arguments before the Court, U.S. Attorney Richard Henry Dana, Jr., consciously sought to limit
the scope of the government's position, maintaining that the only subject concerned "the power of the
President before Congress shall have acted, in case of a war actually existing." The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 635, 660 (1862).
Indeed, at the time, the decision was understood to refer specifically to the singular and
extraordinary phenomenon of the Civil War. A central justification for the President's expanded
authority was that, according to Grier, while Congress "alone has the power to declare a national or
foreign war," no clause in the Constitution gave it the authority to "declare war against a State, or any
number of States." Id. at 668. This was critical because ordinarily the President's war powers (such as
under the commander-in-chief clause) were only triggered once Congress had sanctioned the use of
force, legally initiating the start of armed hostilities. But in this context, following the attack on Fort
Sumter, the Union clearly found itself facing a massive insurrection and thus a de facto state of war.
Moreover, Congress did not have the constitutional power to declare war against rebelling states and
thereby give the conflict its dejure legislative approval. As a result, Grier concluded that although this
Civil War could not be "declared" through traditional means, as a matter of common sense a war still
existed and still triggered the full panoply of the President's Article II powers. Id.
In the end, while the Grier opinion justified a specific instance of unilateral executive action, The
Prize Cases--unlikeMitchell v. Harmony-never reached war powers more broadly, let alone issues of
foreign invasion or offensive American action abroad. If anything, based on Grier's constitutional
distinction between civil wars and foreign wars, presumably he would have been deeply suspicious of
how post-9/11 government lawyers have extended The Prize logic. Not unlike Lincoln, The Prize
Cases majority presumed that the ruling was bound to the supreme exigencies of state secession and
did not imply a wider reordering of the constitutional roles of the executive and the legislative
branches.
12 Mitchell,

3

54 U.S. at 135.

Id. at 134.
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Dred Scott v. Sandford.' But along classic Jacksonian lines-he had
been Jackson's Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury-Taney
combined such defenses of a racially exclusive polity with the belief that
white settlers (regardless of property or wealth) were universally worthy of
full citizenship and self-rule." 5 On its face, this combination may well
strike today's reader as contradictory. On the one hand, Jacksonians like
Taney depicted the early republic as subject to near continuous threat from
external groups like Native Americans and African slaves, and, as a
consequence, they justified practices of subordination and expropriation.
Yet, at the same time (as discussed below), Taney also held absolutely firm
to the belief that constitutional life should be organized on the Lockean
premises of presumptive peace-only punctuated occasionally by warand widespread (white) security knowledge. 1 6
In a sense, this
discontinuity spoke to an implicit feature of Lockean thought, one that
early Americans took for granted and as politically foundational. In The
Second Treatise, Locke famously defended indigenous dispossession on
grounds that Native Americans left the continent a "wild woods and
uncultivated waste[.]"' 17 In line with such claims, English colonists in the
years before the Revolution often questioned whether the colonies were
indeed conquered at all and presented Anglo plantations instead as
"settled" land. This category of royal dominion had its basis in the legal
principle of res nullius, or the notion that "[a] thing of no owner belongs to
the first finder.""' 8 For most imperial officials in Europe, res nullius had
generally been ignored as a justification for empire, because it contradicted
the evident reality of indigenous presence and colonial warfare." 9 Yet
Locke's notion of untilled land as an "uncultivated waste" suggested to
American settlers that territory could be both inhabited and still empty for
moral and political purposes.
Moreover, this Lockean image of North America as "empty" did not
merely reject Indian claims to territorial sovereignty or property rights; it
presupposed a fundamental erasure of Native American presence. It
legitimated dispossession as morally necessary, because only settlers
114There, Taney notoriously wrote of the legal status of blacks, whether slave or free: "They had
for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect ....
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393,407 (1856).
115For more on how Taney connected settler judgments of internal liberty and external exclusion,
see RANA, supra note 76, at 167-72.
116 See infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text (discussing Taney's view of Lockean
principles).
117LOCKE, supra note 52, at 24.
11 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward
Coke's BritishJurisprudence,21 LAW & HIST. REv. 439,471 & n. 150 (2003).
"19Id. at 461-62.
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transformed the continental wilderness into a site for social utility. By
contrast, supposed Native American failure to do so meant that as a moral
fact they did not exist on the land. In essence, the settlers were the real
"natives," who discovered a pristine and untouched new world. 2 ° As a
consequence, a Jacksonian committed to territorial expansion and
continuous conflict with indigenous communities could nonetheless view
such everyday violence neither as projects of conquest nor as "warfare"
proper-especially since the latter would challenge fundamentally the
presumptive social condition of peace. Above all, this meant that the land
and material abundance that sustained Jeffersonian faith in widespread
security knowledge were grounded in practices of intense violencepractices that were largely erased from collective self-understanding. In
fact, one might well conclude that, in reality, both Locke's philosophical
framework and the early republic's political structure were much more
akin to a concealed Hobbesian state marked by endemic war. Given this
implicit feature of the early republic, it is thus not surprising that the figure
who best articulated a xenophobic and expansionist America (in Dred
Scott) as well as one committed to popular security knowledge and checks
on military and executive power (in Mitchell v. Harmony) was the same
individual-Roger Taney.
In the Mitchell ruling, Taney began by railing against governmental
assertions of secrecy. According to the opinion, executive officials could
not base claims merely on secret information and expect the Court to
accept their judgments. If Colonel Mitchell wanted to assert that the
plaintiff planned on violating the law by trading with the enemy, "these
rumors and suspicions" had to be backed up by publicly offered
evidence.' 2' As he declared, "[t]he fact that such an intention existed must
be shown; and of that there is no evidence."1' 22 Taney then proceeded to
argue that the trial court had been correct to conclude that whether an
emergency in actuality existed, and thus the security measures were
potentially justified, was a matter of fact for the jury to decide. 23 Thus,
Taney not only rejected the notion that the judiciary should defer to
conclusions reached by military officers or executive officials about what
may or may not constitute a crisis; in his view, these personnel enjoyed no
special decision-making prerogative, based on arguments about superior
training or experience. He viewed determinations of threat as ultimately
rooted in shared and popularly accessible judgments about safety and
survival-judgments that might reasonably be reached by a group of
120For more on the legal and political implications in the early republic of indigenous erasure, see
RANA, supra note 76, at 9,49-50, 106-14.
121Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133 (1851).

Id.
123
Id.at 135.
122
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ordinary Americans drawn from a representative pool of citizens.
Moreover, Taney articulated a remarkably narrow legal standard for
emergency. In keeping with the Lockean view developed at the founding,
he believed that the general social condition was one of peace and that
crisis amounted to an extraordinary break from normal politics.' 24 Inorder
to ensure that this presumptive order prevailed and was not overturned by
false claims of crisis, Taney believed that courts should be especially
For an
reticent to expand the scope of governmental prerogative.
emergency to exist, one that justified ceding discretionary authority to the
president or to his military subordinates, the threat needed to be both
"immediate and impending[,]' ' 125 approximating an armed attack or
invasion. And, critically, what counted as "immediate and impending"
could not be based purely on the executive branch actor's "honest
27
6
It had to accord with what a "reasonable"'
judgment" of events.'
person would believe when placed in a similar informational situation. It
was therefore up to a jury of ordinary citizens to assess if this threshold had
been met. 128 Thus, if officials sought to avoid liability they would have to
provide such a jury with all the relevant information-secret or
otherwise-that might enhance the perceived reasonableness of their
security decisions. In effect, Taney rejected wholesale any stratification
between elite and mass judgment in questions of war and peace or in
legitimate access to sensitive information. This rejection took for granted
that the public enjoyed the basic capacity to understand what kinds of
threats were major rather than minor and how each type might best be
addressed.
Perhaps most important, it further assumed that these views were
grounded in ordinary rationality, namely conceptions of reasonableness
that emerged through everyday experience. This reasonableness approach
was fundamentally distinct from what in contemporary case law is referred
to as the "reasonable officer"'129 standard. This alternative standard is one
id.at 134 ("And where the owner has done nothing to forfeit his rights, every public

124See

officer is bound to respect them, . . . [unless] the danger must be immediate and impending . . . and

where the action of the civil authority would be too late in providing the means which the occasion
calls for.").
125Id.
126Mitchell, 54
127

id.

U.S. at 135.

128id.
129For

a discussion and critique of the standard, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810,

812-13 (1996) (detailing the reasonable officer standard and finding that as long as there is probable
cause that a person has violated a traffic code, an officer is considered to be acting constitutionally
under the reasonable officer standard, regardless of subjective intentions); see also Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 615-16 (1999) (holding that an officer must be reasonably aware that bringing members
of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant is lawful, in light of clearly
established law and information available to said officer at the time, in order to be found not guilty of
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for professional experts, and courts often apply it to assess whether police
officers may have used excessive force. 130 Such a determination assumes
that being an armed professional is a skill-based activity that entails a
higher degree of expertise than what is broadly enjoyed. Thus, the
question before courts in recent decades primarily has concerned how a
reasonable officer (rather than a reasonable individual per se) would
behave under the same or similar circumstances. Taney was pointedly not
pursuing this contemporary logic for armed professions. Although soldiers
and officials no doubt may have special training or experience with
warfare, this training and experience did not provide them with uniquely
useful insight regarding how to make initial sense of threats, interpret
information, or reach policy determinations. Indeed, given prevailing
suspicions at the time of standing armies, professional soldiers were often
viewed as institutionally liable to overemphasize perceived dangers or the
need for emergency measures.' 3 1 Thus, Taney rejected wholesale
executive branch or military claims to security expertise; instead he
imagined citizens as fully equipped to reach conclusions about military
necessity and-more broadly-to shape policies about war, peace, and
common defense. For Taney, the subject of security was at root accessible
to democratic deliberation and, if anything, embodied a critical site for the
public to exercise political responsibility
through popular institutions,
32
juries.1
and
legislatures
especially
The ideological continuities between the Republican Lincoln and the
Democrat Taney, author of DredScott, further underscore the centrality of
the Lockean vision of knowledge and security to early American
constitutional politics.
Despite their profound political and legal
disagreements, Lincoln and Taney nonetheless could both agree on the
value of democratizing intelligence; they argued jointly against the
legitimacy of stratifying decision-making responsibilities between elite and
mass constituencies. And they justified this view by a set of sociological
violating constitutional protections); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (finding that it
is possible for an officer to "reasonably but mistakenly conclude" that probable cause is present and, in
these cases, there is no constitutional right infringement based on the reasonable officer standard).
0
13 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 386 (2007) (finding that claims of excessive force in
the course of a seizure are properly evaluated under the objective reasonableness standard that applies
to officers under the Fourth Amendment); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-397 (1989) (holding
that "the 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force [by an officer] must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer . . . [and must take into account] the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation").
'3 See Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 135 (characterizing the actions of military officers as motivated by
"zeal for the honor and interest of his country" and "excitement of military operations," compared to
the more objective perspectives of Congress and the Court).
132See id. (concluding that the reasonableness of an officer's decision is a question for the jury,
and the legal ramifications of his behavior is a question for Congress).
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and ethical claims about popular knowledge and political capacity, claims
that stretched back to the philosophy of John Locke. Certainly for Taney,
the most central element of this shared security discourse was the notion
that there existed no "science" of security, with technical proofs of right or
wrong discoverable by professional training. The following sections
explore what happened to this Lockean paradigm and how it became
eclipsed in American legal and political practice. The startling implication
of this shift is that Lincoln and Taney may, in important respects, share
with each other more conceptual similarities than we do today with either.
IV. THE NEW DEAL, WORLD WAR II, AND THE RISE OF SECURITY
EXPERTISE

These baseline conceptual judgments about the meaning of security
meant that prior to the 1940s, the overall infrastructure undergirding
American national defense held little in common with what we see today.
In particular, the widespread belief that matters of war and peace should be
decided through transparent and democratic mechanisms generated
institutional arrangements that emphasized civilian control and
deemphasized secrecy. 3 3 The executive branch's defense apparatus was
quite small by comparison with the present day. The State Department
dominated the formulation of peacetime foreign policy and the
professional military (represented in executive branch deliberation by the
War Department and the Navy) enjoyed a restricted institutional role in
devising policy. 134 Moreover, the United States had a limited foreign
intelligence network with few actual spies, relying instead on overseas
military attachrs, Foreign Service officials, Americans living abroad, and
members of the press. 135
Presumptions against both secrecy and
heightened bureaucracy were believed to be necessary for curtailing the
ability of centralized actors-particularly executive officials and military
personnel-to make unilateral judgments about defense and emergency.
Two massive political events produced a conceptual reevaluation of
the prevailing wisdom and, ultimately, set the stage for the modem account
of security: the Great Depression and the attack on Pearl Harbor. As this
Part argues, against the backdrop of these events, influential scholars,
policymakers, and legal actors began to question the wisdom of leaving
issues of basic survival to mass deliberative judgments. In particular,
social scientists contended that modem sociological conditions were
increasingly too complex for most citizens to make sense of and thus that
133DOUGLAS T. STUART, CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: A HISTORY OF THE LAW
THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 34(2008).
4

13

Id. at 34-35.

See id. at 34-36 (describing, in particular, the remarkably small intelligence infrastructure that
existed in the United States on the eve of World War II).
131
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issues of threat and necessity were no longer domains of popular
understanding. 136 In the process, they invoked those elements of Hobbes's
old security narrative that promoted absolutism, such as his belief in
permanent and continuous crisis, while rejecting Hobbes's democratic
dimension, i.e., his account of a shared mass and elite epistemological
position. These claims first took root among New Deal reformers in the
context of economic security, but as the 1930s closed they began to
dominate the country's foreign policy establishment as well.
A. The GreatDepression and the Rule ofExperts
The basic impetus to reconceive judgments about the relationship
between security and knowledge was not the result of any foreign threat,
but rather of domestic economic upheavals caused by the Great
Depression. These new notions only later migrated to the domain of war
and peace. Therefore, taking some time to recover this initial intellectual
background is useful for making sense of the process by which the
Lockean paradigm collapsed.
Following the stock market crash of 1929, the United States plunged
into deep financial crisis, which by 1932 had cut the gross national product
by a third and prices by half.137 The Depression generated nearly
wholesale joblessness as unemployment figures rose from 429,000 in
October 1929 to over fifteen million, or one-third of the labor force, in
1933.138 Without work, men and women were left absolutely destitute,
facing eviction and foreclosure and unable to feed or clothe their
families. 39 For many public intellectuals and politicians, this general
experience of immiseration and poverty transformed the specific goal of
economic security (i.e., freedom from material necessity) from one among
a competing number of social issues into the essential precondition for
political life.' 40 As British philosopher Harold Laski-a staunch supporter
of FDR and the New Deal-wrote in 1938, if individuals remain destitute
and bound to economic necessity, "liberty is not worth having. Men may
4
well be free and yet remain unable to realize the fruits of freedom."' '1
According to Laski, basic economic welfare was the primary means for all
136See

infra notes 172-176 and accompanying text.

.37
ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 195 (1998).
138FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:

WHY THEY

SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 46, 108 (1977).
139See id.at 47-48 (detailing the impact of widespread unemployment on daily American life

during the Great Depression).
140See FONER, supra note 137, at 196 ("[T]he Depression ... reinvigorat[ed] the Progressive
conviction that the national state must protect Americans from the vicissitudes of the marketplace....
[N]ow, economic security, not the civil and political rights of the former slaves and their descendants,
dominated discussions of freedom.").
14'HAROLD J. LASKI, LIBERTY IN THE MODERN STATE 51 (1949).

2012]

WHO DECIDESON SECURITY?

1453

other shared ends. For this reason, it should properly precede our normal
political debates and disagreements. 42 In the words of Sidney Hillman, a
key organizer of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and one of the
most popular figures in the union movement, 143 economic security
was
44
nothing less than the "central issue in this life of modem man."'
For New Dealers, the Depression made clear that all Americans-145
regardless of sectional or class background-shared a common goal.
But it also highlighted that the new industrial economy, marked by
interdependence, heightened bureaucracy, and wild cycles of booms and
busts, had made it systematically impossible for ordinary citizens to
provide for their own economic self-preservation. Journalist Abraham
Epstein, whose 1933 book, Insecurity: A Challenge to America, played a
pivotal role in justifying comprehensive social insurance and ultimately the
Social Security Act of 1935,146 provided perhaps the most extensive
discussion of this new collective wisdom: namely that popular capacities
were increasingly being outstripped by ever-more complex economic
realities. 47 According to Epstein, in the past, the United States was
primarily a society of independent homesteaders and artisans. This meant
that individuals and families were often self-sufficient, and that as long as
they had access to property or the tools of a trade, they could ensure their
own material survival. 148 By contrast, the rise of industrial wage labor and
142See

id.at 34-35.
Hillman, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN JEWISH HISTORY 370-72 (Stephen H.
Norwood & Eunice G. Pollack eds., 2008).
144Steve Fraser, The 'Labor Question', in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 19301980, at 55, 78 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).
145 Social scientist Max Rubinow was among the key New Dealers in emphasizing the prepolitical nature of economic welfare and in calling on government to take responsibility for providing
all citizens with basic material needs. He famously titled his book on the subject, The Quest for
Security. See I.M. RUBINOW, THE QUEST FOR SECURITY 8, 626-29 (1934) (beginning his work with
the proposition that a key tenet of American democracy is the "right to enjoy life," and concluding his
work with a summary of how Washington could implement the means to ensure the protection of such
a right in the future).
146Although Epstein personally believed that the Social Security Act was insufficient and
opposed financing through a payroll tax, his efforts in the preceding years-as an author and as the
founder of the American Association of Social Security-helped popularize the term and create the
climate for the bill. As Glenn Altschuler writes, Epstein "crisscrossed the nation, organized the March
on Albany, and lobbied politicians to support legislation that would provide economic protection for
the elderly and combat the Depression by enhancing the purchasing power of the masses." Glenn
Altschuler, Security a Father's Place in American Social History, FORWARD (Nov. 9, 2007),
http://forward.com/articles/l 1973/securing-a-father-s-place-in-american-social-his-/.
147
See ABRAHAM EPSTEIN, INSECURITY: A CHALLENGE TO AMERICA 18-19 (1933) (detailing the
effects of modem labor practices on the average wage-earning, observing "Itihe worker under the
factory system has no stake in industry; he is given no right to his job. His employer is bound neither
legally nor morally to provide him with regular employment; he feels no obligation to support him
during emergencies.").
148Id. at 3-4.
141Sidney
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salaried work meant that individuals no longer controlled their economic
fortunes; as Epstein argued, financial well-being "depend[ed] entirely upon
the stability of [their] jobs., 149 According to him, "[i]t is our present
complex civilization which, while conquering nature, time and space, has
made men the slaves of their jobs.' ' °
In Epstein's view, while scientific progress and economic
concentration had brought with it tremendous gains in science, technology,
and material abundance, it had also come at the cost of creating heightened
forms of dependence. Trapped in large-scale bureaucratic and corporate
institutions, individuals were at the mercy of external market conditions for
basic material necessities.''
This dependence meant that economic
insecurity was now a pervasive and dominant social experience.' 5 2 Given
the cyclical and interconnected nature of the economy, destitution was
always a present possibility. As such, Epstein concluded that for most
Americans, financial uncertainty had become "their paramount problem"
because "the slightest interruption or reduction in their wages or any
increase in expenditures
immediately condemns them to defenselessness
' 53
and poverty."'

These developments not only suggested that individuals could no
longer shape the conditions necessary for their own economic selfpreservation. It also implied that they no longer understood the forces that
produced either wage interruptions or price reductions, and therefore, how
best to achieve long-term material well-being. For a salaried employee in
a large corporate entity, one's livelihood might well depend on decisions
made in a far comer of the economy or on the rippling effect of downturns
in distant financial sectors-a fact magnified by the rise of nationalized
markets

for

goods

and

products. 5

4

Such

events

were

often

incomprehensible to the average individual, let alone subject to their
foresight and prediction. Moreover, this lack of knowledge underscored a
general sense of anxiety in which many citizens viewed economic life as a
permanent state of crisis beyond their control or meaningful
intervention. 55 For Epstein, the solution was ultimately twofold. First, it
required that the government employ state resources to create social
insurance schemes for the aged, disabled, and unemployed, which would

149Id. at 3.
0
15 Id. at4.
151Id. at 6.
152id.
153id.
154See id. (detailing the developing financial interconnectedness of all professions of Americans

and the uncertainty such dependence created).
155

Id.
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establish a broad safety-net to address problems of destitution. 56 Second,
and just as important, society required the education and empowerment of
trained experts, who were not only capable of devising and running these
new state programs, but who also had specialized knowledge in how the
economy worked and how it could be adjusted
to smooth the prevailing
57
and destructive pattern of booms and busts.
This defense of expertise did not emerge out of nowhere. In particular,
it had important precedents in the institutional practices and intellectual
currents of the Progressive Era. The first decades of the twentieth century
witnessed the increasing bureaucratic complexity of government and the
economy, developments that generated a plethora of new social groups and
occupational categories, from salaried employees to lawyers, doctors,
engineers, social workers, and teachers. As members of these new middle
classes, many Progressive intellectuals saw a basic incompatibility
between what Walter Lippmann evocatively called the nineteenth century
belief in the "omnicompetent citizen '' g and modem industrial and
political realities. Rather than relying primarily on popular judgment and
common sense, such Progressive reformers instead hoped to harness the
expert knowledge of the new professions in order to address diverse social
problems.' 59 As none other than Louis Brandeis famously told the Harvard
Ethical Society in 1905 (a speech a young Felix Frankfurter attended and
was quite moved by), 160 it was up to the professional classes to shape the
direction of American political life:
The people's thought will take shape in action; and it lies
with us, with you to whom in part the future belongs, to
say on what lines the action is to be expressed; whether it
is to be expressed wisely and temperately, or wildly and
intemperately; whether it is to be 61expressed on lines of
evolution or on lines of revolution.'
In keeping with these sentiments, the Progressives' administrative
apparatus extended dramatically into multiple arenas of collective life, with
56See id.at 663-64 ("The most desirable program would be for Congress to enact a

comprehensive social insurance law for the entire nation.").
"Id. at 672.
158WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 273, 284 (1922).
159
See id. at 30-32 (concluding that to effectively govern according to public opinion there must
be an "independent, expert organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to
make the decisions").
'60
See David Luban, The Twice-Told Tale of Mr. Fixit: Reflections of the Brandeis/Frankfurter
Connection,91 YALE L.J. 1678, 1704 (1982).
161LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 313, 343 (New
York, Augustus M. Kelley 1971) (1914).
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the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Food and Drug
Administration, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade
Commission, and World War I's War Industries Board, among many
others. 62 In the process, these institutions helped unleash the social power
of emerging professional groups. 16 3 Just as crucially for later practices,
while Progressive commissions were ostensibly under legislative control,
such expert bodies enjoyed extensive independence from any electoral or
participatory check.164
Indeed, by the time of the New Deal, concerns about omnicompetent
citizenship and faith in social scientific and professional expertise had
increasingly become conventional wisdom among the new generation of
policymakers. As Robert Lynd, the author of two classics of American
sociology, Middletown and Middletown in Transition, wrote, "so great is
our reliance upon the rational omni-competence of human beings, that we
largely persist . . .in the earlier habit of leaving everything up to the
individual's precarious ability to 'use his head.""0 65 For Lynd, Epstein, and
others, it was precisely this tendency to allow ordinary rationality and
common sense to drive collective decision-making that was in part
responsible for the economic collapse. 66 Rather than simply having
citizens use their "heads," new conditions necessitated that policymakers
elevate the role of professional classes, placing far greater responsibility in
the hands of economists and political scientists, not to mention lawyers,
doctors, and engineers. These professionals operated on the basis of actual
empirical information regarding the nature of modem bureaucracy,
industrial life, and interdependence. 167 This information gave them
quantifiable insight into problems of material wellbeing; it meant that their
judgments about social policy amounted to objective determinations of

162Robert

L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in Historical Perspective,38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1191,

1194, 1223, 1228 n.110, 1237 (1986).
161See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,

BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF

NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES,

1877-1920, at 286 (1982) (discussing how university-

trained professionals were at the forefront of championing "bureaucratic alternatives" to respond to
"new environmental demands").
164
For more generally on the rise of the administrative state and Progressive era precedents for
New Deal practices, see id. at 209-11.
165 ROBERT

S. LYND, KNOWLEDGE FOR WHAT? THE PLACE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN AMERICAN

CULTURE 234 (1939).
166
See id.at 234 (suggesting the personal and cultural dilemmas of U.S. society during the
Depression were a result of reliance on the "rational omni-competence of human beings"); EPSTEIN,
supra note 147, at 659-61 (discussing how the emphasis on common sense and pursuit of materialism
among business and political leaders led to a failure to foresee the Depression).
167See LYND, supra note 165, at 18-19 (noting how professional groups, such as economists,
political scientists, and other social scientists rely on quantitative methods to respond to different
problems in society).
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right and wrong. 168 And because such technical knowledge could not be
accessed by most Americans, it also suggested that professional expertsoperating independent of public opinion and mass prejudices-were best
equipped to solve endemic social problems.
During this heyday of New Deal faith in administrative expertise, it
was common to argue that such professional groups (akin to Brandeis's
views at the beginning of the century)' 69 could be counted on to pursue
society's long-term needs rather than destructive partial or selfish
interests. 7 ° Since their focus was on discerning scientific facts, they were
1
consequently disinterested and committed above all to the public good. 71
Lynd, for example, saw the New Deal's reformist impulse as the
progressive spread of empirical truth to social institutions and asserted that
"[t]here is evidence that liberal attitudes . . . are correlated with
intelligence, and there is a great deal of evidence of the correlation of
conservatism with property ownership.' 72 Therefore, as liberal social
scientists took over decision-making from private business and legislative
majorities, knowledge would itself become the guide for collective life.
But a key point about such policy experts was that, while dedicated to
the public good, they were not generalists-a point that even Brandeis had
presumed. 173 This was because, according to Lynd, the sheer depth of
modem complexity now made it nearly impossible for one individual to
understand the inner workings of all spheres of collective life. Rather, new
professional decision-makers were specialized in a particular sliver of
economic or bureaucratic organization. Yet taken as a whole, this
patchwork of skilled specialists-located in diverse agencies across
government and the private sector-could work jointly to bring order to
the seemingly incomprehensible mass of institutions and social
phenomena. 174 This emerging focus on expertise was also distinct from the
older idea of the grand statesman. 75 Social scientists claimed only role168See id. at 120-22 (discussing how social scientists drew on empirical information to develop
"scientific objectivity").
169See BRANDEIS, supra note 161, at 325-27 (arguing that lawyers, as a professional group,
should spearhead solutions to the country's problems).
170For more, see James Morone's excellent discussion of the New Deal administrative belief in

the value of social science and administrative "rule by experts."

JAMES A. MORONE, THE
DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 129-42

(Yale University rev. ed. 1998) (1990).
171Id. at 115-16 (explaining how skilled experts within administrative agencies would
draw on
objective data to make their decisions, all for the common good of the people).
172
LYND, supra note 165, at 247-48.
173
BRANDEIS, supra note 161, at 1-4.
174See LYND, supra note 165, at 12-17 (discussing how professionals across various disciplines
have strived to "break down their disciplinary walls" and "cross fertilize each other").
175For more on the concept of statesmanship, particularly in the domain of foreign policy, see
generally HENRY KISSLNGER, DIPLOMACY 23-28 (1994). For an account that presents statesmanship as
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specific decision-making ability and, unlike a towering political figure, did
not assert any capacity for greater moral judgment or political virtue. 'The
new experts emphasized the objective nature of their information-rather
than the quality of their personal character-and thus grounded their right
to authority on quantifiable skills.
In effect, Epstein, Lynd, and others sketched the outlines of a
fundamentally altered relationship between knowledge and decisionmaking. They presented a modem world in which industrial complexity
and new national markets left individuals subject to extreme economic
vicissitudes. Moreover, the causes and implications of these forces were
beyond the average citizen's general understanding. While these ideas
emerged in the context of the Depression, they quickly and
comprehensively translated to issues of external threat and common
defense.
B. Pendleton Herringand the New National Security State
Among the individuals most responsible for this translation of New
Deal judgments about expertise to the domain of war and peace was
Pendleton Herring. In the process, he helped to fashion an emerging
security concept-far removed from the old Lockean position-that
justified a dramatic restructuring of government institutions toward greater
hierarchy and executive discretion.'76 Herring was a political science
professor in Harvard's Government Department who later became
president of both the American Political Science Association and the
Social Science Research Council, as well as the first Secretary of the U.N.
Atomic Energy Agency. 177 During World War II, he chaired the
Committee of Records of the War Administration, overseeing the
publication of The United States at War, the official governmental account
of the war.' 78 In his most central public policy role, he then went on to be
one of the primary authors of 1947's National Security Act, which
fundamentally reorganized the nature of American civil and military
relations and generated our current defense policy framework. 7 9 In two
books, Public Administration and the Public Interest and The Impact of
War, Herring defended the growing case for the benefits of professional

the lawyer ideal par excellence, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 109, 113-16 (1993).
176STUART,

supra note 133, at 5-6.
at 5, 9-10, 274.
178Id. at 9.
179For an excellent account of Herring's career and his influence in structuring new defense
177Id

practices, see id. at 9, 27-30.
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expertise. 18 In particular, he argued forcefully that the same specialized
skills that were being applied to the economy could be employed equally to
address gathering military threats from abroad.' 8 '
Like Epstein and Lynd, i8 2 Herring too had been an avid New Dealer.
For him, the Depression underscored that any belief in a self-regulating
commercial society-and with it a purely negative role for governmentwas profoundly inadequate. In his view, "[t]he freedom of a competitive
capitalistic order is not compatible with" the goal of protecting individuals
from economic uncertainty. 83 In keeping with other New Dealers, he saw
freedom from destitution as an overriding aim of collective life and
considered that "if a guarantee of economic security is demanded of the
government, it must be forthcoming at whatever price.' 8 4 As a
consequence, Herring took as a foundational element of the new politics
the unavoidable truth that "[t]he day of the positive state is upon us. This
is not a matter of choice."' 85 Moreover, this state intervention could not be
organized along lines that emphasized the dominance of the legislative
branch and thus mass popular participation. He argued that public
involvement was a recipe for potential financial ruin, in which "the whole
structure [of the economy] will topple and crash."' 6 Pluralistic and
widespread deliberation on matters of material survival would only lead to
conflict and to decision-making driven by special interests rather than
those with actual knowledge about social conditions. As he argued,
87
"Congress is torn by blocs and dominated by organized groups."'
Indeed, while Madison's vision of divided government may have been
appropriate for an earlier epoch, in the 1930s and 1940s it only accentuated
these problems of disorder and governmental capture by business and
sectional entities.18 8 For Herring, "[a] remote system of checks and
balances between Congress and the President and between House and
Senate has proved a device for stalemate and delay rather than for unity or
responsibility of control.' 8 9 He believed that the solution was to develop
an institutional structure "for introducing expertise"' 90 into political
80

1 PENDLETON HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR 46-48 (1941); PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936).
181HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR, supranote 180, at 22-23.
182 EPSTEIN, supranote 147, at 662-65.
183Pendleton Herring, A Prescription for Modern Democracy, 180 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &

Soc. SCI. 138, 138 (1935).

14id.
185 HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR, supra note 180, at 22.
186

Herring, supranote 183, at 139.

'Ild. at 140.

188See id. (discussing how sectionalism and disparate interest groups have disrupted the country's

national character).
9

.. Id. at 139.

190Id. at 140 (emphasis omitted).
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decision-making. Such expertise would "join the disparate economic
forces of society behind a unified political program[,]' 19' one that focused
state action on the objective and technical provision of social welfare and
material necessity.
In Herring's opinion, the only sustainable method of ensuring this
unity of purpose was by substantially expanding executive power and
eliminating many of the existing checks on presidential prerogative: "The
vast increase of the President's powers is a trend that must be encouraged
for the sake of democratic government. There is great need for guidance
and unity in the framing of national policy, and this can best be done
through the Chief Executive. ' '9 Importantly, however, this increase was
not meant to establish supreme authority in the single will of the President
himself, 93 as Hobbes may have imagined centuries earlier. Instead,
Herring saw the executive branch as the best institutional site for situating
new experts skilled in the science of economics and capable of making
informed decisions about matters of industry and finance. 94 He called for
a series of agencies within the executive branch, each attuned to studying
and solving specific aspects of the broader question of economic necessity.
'1 95
Above these agencies would be a "national administrative council."
This council would combine and articulate expert advice, and in the
process create a unified policy framework out of the patchwork structure of
specialized professionals. 96 Herring concluded that, "[o]ur goal is not the
eradication of all disagreement, but rather the expression of a state purpose
by a responsible agency expert in character
and in close touch with the
' 97
realities of the situation that must be met."'
Thus, Herring ultimately sought the elevation of a professional elite
rather than any particular official or actor (such as the President). This
elite would staff scientific agencies within the executive branch and
thereby "become the responsible agent of public purpose."'9 8 Thus, the
role of the President would be to take these technical judgments and
present them to the public at large, where citizens could choose to "accept
or reject"'199 the programmatic agenda developed by administrators. The
inevitable and, for Herring, much needed consequence would be a drastic
191Id.

'9' Id. at 141.

193
See id. at 143 (discussing the need for a stronger, more unified executive branch, rather than a
government where the Office of the President alone was the central site of policymaking).
'94 Id. at 142-45.
'9'Id.at 143.
196
See id. at 143-45 (discussing how the council would have powers to utilize experts both inside
and outside the government and coordinate the necessary resources to help the President solve pressing
national problems).
197/d. at 146.

'9'Id.at 148.
199Id.
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reduction in the lawmaking responsibilities of Congress. According to
Herring, "[i]f Congress wishes to go contrary to the recommendations of
this body, it remains free to do so, but it is ...put on the defensive, and its
decisions are open to the suspicious scrutiny of the administration, the
20 0
public, and the special interests allied with the Presidential program.,
At the same time, he also hoped to limit the President's own function,
precisely because presidents too may be beholden to special interests and
swayed by irrational public opinion.2 °' Instead, Herring imagined an
insulated decision-making apparatus, independent of mass prejudice and
corporate capture, which could set the parameters for political debate
within representative government.2 °2 He realized that such a vision
appeared to repudiate much of the democratic notion of self-rule, but
argued that these changes were essential given modem complexity and its
related disorders.2 °3 If individuals sought a "peaceful adjustment of social
thereby involve[d] a willingness . . . to make substantial
conflicts, it
'2 °4
sacrifices.
As the 1930s drew to a close and Americans started to focus on
international events, Herring began connecting these arguments about
executive and administrative power to the looming specter of war. Herring
maintained that those issues of modern complexity and permanent crisis
that plagued domestic economic life were even more troubling in the
context of foreign affairs. 20 5 There, the rise of totalitarian regimes meant
that the United States now faced external enemies that, due to ideology,
could not be deterred in the same way as old European rivals. Moreover,
technological improvements-especially the rise of air power-indicated
that the United States was no longer safe behind the oceans.20 6 Hamilton
had once imagined that American isolation ensured that peace from foreign
threat was the pervasive social experience. 2 °7 Now,by contrast, scientific
200

Herring, supra note 183, at 146-47.

201Id. at 147.
202 See

id.at 148 ("The bureaucracy must become the responsible agent of public purpose. In the

executive branch lies the task of confronting the people generally with an interpretation of the public

interest which they can accept or reject through the established channels of representative
government.").
203Id. at 147.
204Id. at 147.
205 HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR,
206 See

supra note 180, at 15.

Mark R. Shulman, The ProgressiveEra Originsof the National Security Act, 104 DICK. L.

REv. 289, 326 (2000) ("[T]he emergence of post-war technology meant that for the first time an enemy
could strike the continental United States catastrophically.").
207As George Washington's Farewell Address-written, famously, with Hamilton's assistanceconcluded,
"[o]ur detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different
course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is
not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when
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developments implied that domestic tranquility faced continuous dangers
from enemies that could not be accommodated or reasoned with through
arguments about strategic self-interest. As Herring contended in The
Impact of War, the result was that "[ilnternational affairs have become
domestic problems. 2 °8 By this, he not only meant that the home front was
now under potential assault. He also suggested that domestic questions of
economics were increasingly central to matters of defense and military
preparedness. Since industrial production was the key to creating an air
force and a mechanized army, economic prosperity was essential to
limiting the threats posed by external foes. Herring posited that, "[i]n our
economic and social life we must now take on the characteristics of a
people living in proximity to warlike neighbors and engaged in stem
competition. The margins of safety that our democracy has known are
being cut away. ''2°9 What made the problems especially perilous was the
fact that totalitarian regimes were better equipped than democracies to take
advantage of the new technologies of transportation, warfare, and even
communication: the centralized nature of fascist or communist states
allowed them to aggregate authority in expert administrators and to avoid
the inefficiencies and confusion of mass deliberation.
For Herring, the only method for overcoming these new circumstances
was to employ the same conceptual and governmental structures
appropriate to combat the Great Depression, creating a permanent
institutional infrastructure for responding to global threats. He began by
invoking a relatively novel phrase--"national security"2 ° to mirror the
domestic discourse of economic security. The term itself had existed
before, although used less frequently in public debate. Still, Laura
Donohue finds references dating back to the founding, noting that as early
as "the Constitutional Convention, according to James Madison's notes,
Oliver Ellsworth remarked that a national government would help to secure
national security. ' ,211 During World War I, corporations and pro-war
nativists even organized the National Security League, which at its peak in
we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality, we may at any time
resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the
impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving
us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by
justice, shall counsel.
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), http://usinfo.org/docs/democracy/49.htm.
208 HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR, supra note 180, at 15.
209Id. at 15-16.
210 See

211 See

id.
Laura Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 4, 4-5

(forthcoming 2012) (presenting various instance where the term was employed in the first century of
the republic, including by Franklin Pierce in his presidential inaugural address and by both sides during
the Civil War).
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1916 included nearly 100,000 members across the country.212 The League
became a central mechanism for enflaming anti-German, and later anticommunist hysteria, as well as assisting government efforts to suppress
213
But with the end of the Red Scare, the
general opposition to the war.
League crumbled, and by 1940 the organization had declared bankruptcy;
its leader burned the League's archives to avoid public knowledge of its
wartime practices.214 As a result, during the 1930s the term national
security was still largely unfamiliar and carried little of the resonance that
it would for later generations of Americans. 15 In fact, as historian Mark
Neocleous writes, "the multi-volume Encyclopaediaof the Social Sciences,
published by Macmillan in 1934, contained no entry for 'national
security. 216
But now, Herring employed the phrase to argue that just as economic
security was the dominant domestic objective, national security-the
protection of the state and the way of life associated with it-should be
understood as the dominant global objective. The threats to collective
survival meant that defense policy could not be left to the same special
interests and conflicting social forces that so recently brought the country
to financial destitution. Instead the commitment to national security
required a degree of social unity and centralized command, which
outstripped even that needed to confront the Depression. According to
Herring, "[a]s a nation we are facing a new world. This means a drastic
change in the context within which our political institutions operate.' 217
Herring sought to reassure critics by arguing that although he was not
calling for the United States simply to mimic authoritarian states, he
nonetheless believed that the country's leaders could learn from
22 Shulman, supra note 206, at 305.
211 Id. at
214 Id. at

314, 322.
322. The League was founded by Wall Street lawyer Solomon Stanwood Menken and

bankrolled by wealthy businessmen and tycoons like the publishing giant George H. Putman. Id. at
296, 299. By the early 1920s, it became synonymous with nationalist extremism and paranoia.
According to the League, enemies to the country "included all those who were not '100% American,'
eventually meaning not only foreign nationals, pacifists, many immigrants, and political radicals, but
also trade union members, Congressmen who voted against critical pieces of legislation, and even the
people of Wisconsin." Id. at 305-06. For more on the rise and fall of League membership, see JOHN
WHITECLAY CHAMBERS I1, To RAISE AN ARMY: THE DRAFT COMES TO MODERN AMERICA 81-82
(1987).
25 Thus, for my purposes, the central point about the novelty of national security as a concept is
not whether the term had ever been employed previously. It is that during and following World War 11
national security gained a particular meaning-one that has had long-lasting discursive effects. Rather
than simply operating as a synonym for common defense or safety generally (when occasionally
deployed), the term now came to describe a particular vision of security. This vision emphasized
conditions of endemic and complex threat as well as the institutional need for heightened centralization
and secrecy.
216NEOCLEOUS, supranote 62, at 77.
217HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR, supra note 180, at 277.
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authoritarian methods of shaping policy and projecting power. In other
words, "[t]his does not mean that the opponents of Nazi Germany must
become Nazified if they are to resist, but it does mean that totalitarian
states can be8 opposed only through an equally effective mobilization of
21
resources."
Herring believed that such mobilization in the name of national
security necessitated a series of basic shifts in the approach to American
foreign relations. First, it entailed unleashing scientific and military
expertise in the drive to eradicate external threats. 1 9 Just as ordinary
citizens were increasingly incapable of making sense of their own
economic conditions, similar harsh truths governed the global arena.
While individuals had an interest in their own physical protection, they had
limited capacities to gauge the seriousness or immediacy of potential
dangers. In order for such dangers to be assessed properly, government
had to empower professionals skilled in intelligence gathering,
technological development, and military preparedness. In the same way
that economists and other financial experts should address market cycles,
industrial production needs, and the provision of social welfare, similar
professionals--centralized and insulated in the executive branch-also
should exist to oversee matters of war and peace.22 °
Second, this infrastructure should maintain a permanent and
established role for professional soldiers in determining foreign policy
goals. The Lockean security concept had long assumed that not only was
civilian command essential to avoiding military despotism, but also that
ordinary Americans-without any formal training in warfare-were
capable of deciding how best to structure defense resources and military
mobilization. Now, however, Herring asserted that, "if democratic
governments are to cope with the world today the military must have an
accepted place in our scheme of values. 221 Only members of the military
had the knowledge to make sense of specialized questions of preparedness,
which were essential to long-term strategic thinking.
Finally, undergirding such centralization and military influence was a
focus on secrecy and a rejection of old presumptions in favor of political
transparency and public access. In order to respond to threats from abroad,
the state needed to remain one step ahead of its potential enemies. This
required developing a new formalized network of spies, as well as
linguistic and technological experts skilled in collecting and sifting through
2

' Id. at 14.

219 See id. at 279 (for instance, arguing that "freedom necessitates a high degree of co-operation,
organization, and intelligent planning.... Thus freedom depends not upon the shaking off of controls
but upon their skillful administration" through "[e]ducation" and the "promotion of science.").
220 Id.
211Id. at 20.
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intelligence. Above all, this national security framework-built on
expertise, centralization, military influence, and institutional secrecy-took
for granted that just as crisis was a permanent condition of economic life, it
also was a constant element of international politics. 2 22 In contrast to the

assumptions of Locke, Hamilton, or Jefferson, no clear sociological divide
existed between times of war and times of peace. If anything, reality had
come to approximate the old Hobbesian image of endemic insecurity in a
world of ideological antagonism-one utterly bereft of any shared moral
framework. As such, Herring concluded that Americans had to reconcile
themselves, regardless of old fears of military despotism, to the fact that
constant threat meant that,
"[d]emocracy may have to remain under arms
223
for a long time to come.,

At root, Herring's account entailed treating national security as a
unifying commitment, one that (even more so than with economic security)
transcended ordinary popular disagreement and thus was appropriately
removed from the regular political process. He argued that, if threats had
now become continuous and ever-present, it was also the case that, "[a]
democracy can stand under arms and remain true to its values to the extent
that it can call upon deep communal reserves of agreement." 224 For
Herring, while the United States should remain an open society, he
nonetheless concluded that, "[n]o internal resistances to these domestic
efforts can be tolerated., 225 As a consequence, if a balance between liberty
and security must be struck, security had to enjoy primacy of place as both
pre-political and the foundation of American unity. It embodied the
lodestar around which to calibrate constitutional rights and other collective
interests. In Herring's view, although these new arrangements may reject
previous assumptions about popular responsibility and self-rule, they
nonetheless brought with them a far greater likelihood of survival in a
world of unprecedented danger.
As with the New Deal approach to economic crisis, Herring was
certainly not the first to defend the need for greater centralization and
secrecy in confronting perceived threats.
Not surprisingly, these
arguments, too, had crucial precedents in Progressive era developments.
Against the backdrop of the United States' growing global power as well
as concerns about internal labor strife and bureaucratic complexity,
Theodore Roosevelt famously argued for a far more muscular theory of
executive authority, in which the President was "a steward of the people

222See

id. at 277 (discussing the "rapid change at work in our world today and . . . the

interrelations between these forces and our traditional political values").
223HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR, supranote 180, at 277.
2 24

Id. at 282.

221Id. at 14.
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bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could" 226 to ensure the
public's protection and wellbeing. 227 Even more pointedly, World War I
embodied an important test case for the utility of insulated and expert
decision-making in the face of external threat. Woodrow Wilson
established a series of executive institutions to direct industrial production,
wartime labor relations, and propaganda efforts as well as empowered
federal police and prosecutors to crackdown on political dissent.228 In
addition, through authorities provided by 1918's Overman Act, he moved
unilaterally to reorganize existing agencies to better serve the state's
wartime and immediate postwar objectives.229 Such efforts provided a key
template for how Herring twenty years later imagined that the United
States could implement a permanent system of military planning and
national security vigilance.
Indeed, by the eve of World War II, Herring was hardly alone in seeing
the future of American defense and foreign policy practices as extending
Wilsonian prescriptions. In January 1941, social scientist Harold Lasswell,
who too later became president of the American Political Science
Association, famously depicted the United States as headed toward a
"garrison state" in which "the specialists on violence are the most powerful
group in society., 230 In a sense, both Lasswell and Herring were
responding to the zeitgeist, in which many Americans wondered if the
perceived threat posed by fascism and communism-as well as the new
technologies of warfare-required developing more centralized and,
indeed, more authoritarian institutions of statecraft.
For Lasswell,
Herring's national security vision may well have been the inevitable future,
but such structural shifts were to be deplored rather than defended.
Reminding readers of the value of democratic self-governance and the
significant dangers of insulated authority, Lasswell argued that the rise of a
militarized security expertise would inevitably "tip the internal equilibrium
toward narrow rather than wide power sharing" and in the process "favor
the self- perpetuation of an elite specialized
to the planning and
' 23 1
implementation of coercive strategies of power.
But to Washington officials, Herring's national security vision and his
226

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 372 (1914).

227For

more on the expansion of executive power from the late nineteenth century until the 1930s,

see AZIZ RANA, supranote 76, at 222-26, 262-90.
228

See STONE, supra note 99, at 136-33 (detailing efforts during and after World War I by the

Wilson Administration to employ new powers of propaganda and centralized administration to censor
speech,
229 arrest opponents, and deport noncitizens).
DAVID KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 125-26

(2004) (describing the Overman Act and its uses during the war, especially to reorganize the War
Industries Board).
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HAROLD LASSWELL, The Garrison State, in ESSAYS ON THE GARRISON STATE 55, 56 (Jay

Stanley
ed., 1997).
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1d. at 95.
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arguments in The Impact of War appeared particularly prescient given that
they were published only months before the surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor, an event that shattered the old faith in domestic safety behind the
oceans for many political commentators.2 32 Despite Lasswell's warnings
of the potential costs, for foreign policymakers, Pearl Harbor made the
appropriate institutional path seem both self-evident and unavoidable.
Above all, besides underscoring American insecurity, the attack brought
home the perceived limitations of democratic and transparent deliberation;
it justified arguments about why greater secrecy and greater centralization
were both required and had to go hand in hand.
Crucially, the new condition of endemic threat highlighted the
potentially tragic consequences if Americans persisted in counting on
representative and deliberative bodies to behave with the requisite degree
of discretion and long-terming thinking. Even in the early days of the New
Deal, public intellectuals like Charles Beard, another important influence
on Herring, had raised significant concerns that a foreign policy structure
dominated by majoritarian politics only produced factionalism and
divisiveness with "little or no reference to any supreme conception of
national interest rising above [the] particular concerns" 233 of special
interest groups. After Pearl Harbor, the danger posed by majoritarian
institutions appeared even starker. Roosevelt's foreign policy team widely
believed that military preparedness and mobilization had been woefully
compromised by special interest wrangling and democratic incoherence.234
Moreover, given the very recent failure of politicians to create a
unified wartime front and to put security commitments ahead of partisan
point scoring, legislators could not be trusted to handle sensitive
information appropriately. Transparent majoritarian institutions always
held out the potential for leaks (aimed at serving the goals of special
interests), which compromised collective safety or war efforts abroad.
Ultimately, the lesson of Pearl Harbor was that due to the short-term logic
and factionalism of legislative practice, any systematic security policy had
to combine centralization in the executive branch with secrecy from
broader deliberative arenas.
232In

words that mimicked Herring, Secretary of War Henry Stimson wondered aloud to

Roosevelt days after Pearl Harbor "whether our basic theory of defense and reliance upon that fortress
is not too static and whether the Japanese have not ... by this fearful disaster revealed to us a situation
which must be remedied." DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 193 (1977). For more on the role of Pearl Harbor in pressing
policymakers toward what historian Daniel Yergin influentially referred to as the "gospel of national
security" and its related institutional infrastructure, see id. at 193-220.
233CHARLES A. BEARD, THE IDEA OF NATIONAL INTEREST: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY
IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 522 (1934).
234See STUART, supra note 133, at 31-51 (detailing Roosevelt's national security team and how it

responded to Pearl Harbor).

CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1417

Following the war, the National Security Act of 1947,235 aptly using
Herring's phrase, gave legal substance to these shared judgments and the
emerging security discourse. As historian Douglas Stuart writes of the
law:
It created a National Military Establishment, which
became the Department of Defense in 1949. It gave the
Air Force an independent status and provided the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with statutory identity. It established the
National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and a cluster of lesser-known institutions,
including the National Security Resources Board, the
Munitions Board, and the Research and Development
Board.236
Among the long-term implications of these changes was the creation of a
permanent, peacetime structure for gathering intelligence, the elevation of
the policymaking responsibility of military officers, and the dramatic
growth of executive agencies tasked with issues of defense.
In a sense, the implementation of Herring's ideas embodied a direct
assault on the classic Lockean account of the relationship between security,
knowledge, and popular power. The modem security discourse presented
an image of politics marked by uncertainty, public ignorance, and the near
continuous condition of threat or crisis. It thus embodied some of the most
troubling components of Hobbes's seventeenth century account and
ignored those elements still compatible with democratic self-government.
For Hobbes, a basic lack of knowledge left the state of nature as one of war
and anxiety. It also justified the creation of a unified and absolutist
authority to impose security on collective life. But precisely because no
one-neither citizens nor the sovereign-had unique insight into the true
causes and consequences of external threat, Hobbesian politics
nevertheless was compatible with widespread deliberation and democratic
discussion, so long as a final, authoritative decision was reached. By
contrast, Herring-not to mention Lippmann, Epstein, and Lyndindicated that ignorance was a specifically mass political and cultural
phenomenon; the possibility of elite misjudgment was discounted if even
addressed. On the most important issues of war and peace, therefore,
deliberation had limited value in reaching conclusions and indeed was far
more likely to produce greater chaos and instability. Thus, this new
discourse went beyond Hobbes to present a world of hierarchy and danger
with only limited space for popular action.
235

50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
133, at 8.

236STUART, supra note
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One should note that Herring and others did imagine a key check on
state power. Given professional specialization, decision-making in the
modern security state would necessarily incorporate massive numbers of
issue-specific experts and thereby curtail centralizing tendencies. Rather
than a single and absolutist Leviathan (whether an individual or an
assembly), Herring presented decision-making as organized through
pockets of overlapping administrative institutions and actors."' This
inevitably devolved authority across a broad class of professional
managers, each ideally selected on the basis of actual knowledge and
empirical skill. Nonetheless, the new arrangements still expanded
fundamentally the discretion available to these actors and agencies. In
fact, what reinforced this discretion was a concurrent shift in how the
courts by and large came to approach the security judgments made within
the executive broach. Nineteenth century jurists like Taney, wedded to the
belief in democratic intelligence, had considered both judges and juries
fully capable of assessing the reasonableness of security decisions. Taney
saw his responsibility as policing governmental prerogatives and protecting
the sphere for popular decision-making by empowered and knowledgeable
citizens. By contrast, many of his twentieth century counterparts accepted
the truth of role-specific expertise and the need for judicial deference,
particularly in questions of emergency and self-preservation. As the next
section explores, no judge better expressed the emerging approach than
Felix Frankfurter, the great New Deal lawyer and Supreme Court Justice.
V. FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THE DEFERENTIAL COURT
Today, the pervasive tendency of courts to tread lightly with respect to
executive branch determinations of external threat is a central feature of
American legal and political life. This tendency evocatively illustrates the
extent to which Herring's reworking of the security concept has been
internalized even within the judiciary. At first glance, this fact is rather
surprising, given the common image of the courts as an all-knowing and
elevated priesthood.238 Yet, the clear trend in recent decades has been the
237HERRING,

supra note 180, at 213 ("[A]ll interests must feel sufficient confidence in the

administration to do their part freely. If they waste their energies fighting with each other, all is
lost.... The national symphony contains many different instruments and many potential soloists, but a
disciplined response for the sake of harmony renders no musician less a man.").
238Perhaps the most famous twentieth century articulation ofjudicial
supremacy in constitutional
interpretation is the majority opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). There, the Court
expanded upon the meaning of Chief Justice John Marshall's claim in Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). According to the Cooper majority, Marbury stood for the

"principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable

feature of our constitutional system." Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
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steady reduction in judicial confidence to intercede where security
expertise is invoked. In effect, growing judgments about knowledge,
specialization, and threat have not only influenced political policymakers,
but they have also shaped how judges imagine their own function and
responsibilities. Such a reduction in confidence underscores how judges
have come to see themselves as trapped in the same lay position of
uncertainty as ordinary citizens and-therefore like the public writ largeill equipped to intervene in matters of security.
To make sense of how the new security concept transformed the
judicial role, this Part explores the philosophy of Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter, the legal figure who best embodied the ideological
developments of such arguments in mid-twentieth century jurisprudence.
First, it will situate Frankfurter's defense of executive emergency power
within a broader argument about the benefits of administrative expertise
and the pitfalls of judicial activism. The discussion focuses on how
Frankfurter, in defending enhanced decision-making responsibility by
professionals, sought to reimagine the classic definition of democracy
around the idea of merit. For Frankfurter, democracy should not be
thought of as a principle of majority rule or of collective self-government,
but rather as rule by those with natural talent in a socially mobile society.
This Part next describes how Frankfurter applied his theory of merit and
expertise to questions of security, in the process reinscribing unfettered
executive power as the fulfillment rather than the rejection of democratic
practice. Finally, Part V ends with a discussion of how Frankfurter's ideas
continue to shape contemporary case law, highlighted most recently by the
Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project.
A. Merit, the Open Society, and Court Restraint
For Herring, continuous external threats in a world marked by
technological change and totalitarian regimes required compromising on
democratic principles.239 In his view, the move to centralized executive
power, a large-scale defense bureaucracy, and a permanent role for the
professional military in foreign policy were all understood as necessary but
perhaps regrettable developments: he referred to them as "substantial
sacrifices., 240 But for Felix Frankfurter, these changes were perfectly
consistent with what he believed to be an "open society;" to the extent that
they placed authority in talented decision-makers, they suggested a new

239See

Herring, supra note 183, at 147 ("If democracy means the peaceful adjustment of social

conflicts, it thereby involves a willingness on the part of all concerned to make substantial sacrifices in
order 240
that this process may continue.").
See supra notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
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and more compelling vision of democratic practice itself.241 Today,
Frankfurter's arguments about security, merit, and expertise are pervasive
in the law of emergency and executive power; 242 they also capture key
ideological justifications for the country's ever-expanding national security
infrastructure.
In order to appreciate how Frankfurter developed his merit-based
account of the relationship between security and democracy, it is helpful to
begin with his own personal experience. He arrived in New York from
Vienna at the age of twelve as a Jewish immigrant unable to speak
English.24 3 Due to his intelligence and hard work, he rose quickly through
the social ranks.244 He pursued a five-year program at City College of New
York that combined both high school and college, and then went on to
study law at Harvard, where he finished first in his class. 245 For
Frankfurter, this life trajectory spoke to the openness of American society;
the meritocratic nature of collective life distinguished the country from its
European rivals and made it a polity uniquely structured for the
As Frankfurter later
achievement of material and cultural progress.
wrote to FDR on the eve of World War II, social mobility was more than
simply an aspiration, it was a lived experience in the United States and
daily proof that success was open to all those with talent:
Not even you can quite feel what this country means to a
man like me, who was brought here as an eager sensitive
lad of twelve . . . My father . ..fell in love with the
country, and particularly with the spirit of freedom that
was in the air. And so he persuaded my mother to uproot
the family, and from the moment we landed on Manhattan

241See

Richard M. Abrams, Review Essay, The Reputation of Felix Frankfurter, 1985 AM. B.

FOUND. RES. J. 639, 640 (1985) (noting that Frankfurter was part of the New Deal coalition that
ascribed to the view that "[s]ocial evils... could be reduced, and individual freedom enhanced, if men
and women of intelligence and good will made use of governmental mechanisms for the purpose").
242See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting the tendency of Congress to entrench and
facilitate executive power).
243 JEFFREY

D. HOCKETr, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO

L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H. JACKSON 141-42 (1996).

' Id.at 142.
245id.
246See Sanford V. Levinson, Note, The DemocraticFaith of Felix Frankfurter,25 STAN. L. REV.
430, 446-47 (1973) ("[B]elief in the potential of American democracy assumed the status of a religious
credo [for Frankfurter].).

CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1417

I knew, with the sure instinct of a child, that this was my
native spiritual home.247
This belief that America was defined by an ideal of meritocratic
opportunity was hardly a novel one. In a famous letter to John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson argued in the early nineteenth century that there is a
"natural aristocracy among men" who are marked by "virtue and
talents. 248 The natural aristocracy was "the most precious gift of nature
for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. '249 He
distinguished this natural aristocracy from the "artificial aristocracy
founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents., 250 The latter
won its power through circumstances and laws that protected the privileges
of birth-like laws of primogeniture or hereditary political positions. For
Jefferson, what distinguished the American project was a commitment to
ending feudal and oppressive hierarchies and ensuring that those who
wielded power actually deserved this authority. 1
Still, during much of the nineteenth century, calls for aristocracy in any
form faced an uphill political battle, given the overwhelming leveling
impulse-powerfully embodied by Jacksonian politicians and their
supporters. 2 For critics like Orestes Brownson, who rejected any divide
between a "learned" and an "unlearned" class, 253 Jefferson's view was only
egalitarian in appearance. While it repudiated inherited status, wealth, and
power as all undeserved, at its heart the ideal was nonetheless decidedly
inegalitarian. Meritocracy was a theory of society in which a majority
were deferential to, and even subject to, the power and authority of the
naturally talented few. Above all, a natural aristocracy undermined the
presumption in favor of "omnicompetent" citizenship and democratic
intelligence in which basic social knowledge was understood to be widely
distributed. It suggested that differences in raw personal talent translated
into meaningful differences in decision-making capacity, such that a select
few should legitimately wield principal collective power. As a model for
society, Jefferson's vision did not challenge the permanent existence of a
247Letter
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hierarchy, but instead sought to rearrange its membership.
Despite qualms voiced in earlier generations, Frankfurter-like
Herring, Lynd, and others who came of age politically during the Great
Depression-saw modem complexities as increasingly belying
unquestioned Jacksonian faith in mass rationality. As Frankfurter wrote in
The Public and Its Government, the complexities and interdependence of
modem society made "heavy demands upon wisdom and omniscience. ' ' 54
Referencing economic turmoil as just one illustration of the need for
specialized decision-making, Frankfurter declared, "[w]e have seen the
intricate range of problems thrown up by our industrial civilization; the
vast body of technical knowledge, more and more beyond the
comprehension even of the cultivated, which is required for an analysis of
the issues underlying these problems and an exploration of possible
remedies. 255
These views encouraged Frankfurter to reclaim Jeffersonian judgments
about natural aristocracy and to link them explicitly to growing intuitions
about professional expertise. In his view, the complexity of prevailing
conditions indicated that democracy conceived of as popular self-rule
through direct and continuous participation was "not remotely 256
an
automatic device for good government nor even for a peaceful society.'
The only way to make democracy compatible with long-term stability and
security was to think of it in terms of meritocracy, as a political order
marked by social mobility and governed by natural talent and objective
knowledge. Under such an approach, democracy truly consisted of "the
reign of reason on the most extensive scale. 257
This reimagining of democratic ambition and purpose brought with it
two key governmental shifts for Frankfurter. First, like Herring, it led
Frankfurter to call for the expansion of a new administrative state housed
in the executive branch. This apparatus would function in a manner
similar to how he believed practices in England operated, where
the basis of political thinking . . . [was] the pervasive
responsibility of a highly trained and disinterested
permanent service, charged with the task of administering
the broad policies formulated by Parliament and of putting
at the disposal of government that ascertainable body of
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knowledge on which the choice of policies must be
based.258
In essence, while the public through its legislators and elected
representatives would provide general statements of policy direction, it
would be left to insulated administrators in presidential agencies to make
sense of how to conceive of and pursue these goals.
Second, this vision of democracy as meritocracy indicated a profound
wariness of judicial meddling into administrative, congressional, and
presidential judgments. As long as the United States remained bound to
the principle of equal opportunity, such that professional elites-selected
on the basis of natural talent and scientific excellence-framed collective
decision-making, little rationale existed for judicial interventionism and
aggressiveness with respect to the other branches. 25 9 Frankfurter was
particularly troubled by judicial efforts to strike down New Deal legislation
aimed at regulating the economy or providing minimum safeguards to
workers on the basis of theories of substantive due process and freedom of
contract. 260 Frankfurter believed that judges, due to the abstractness of
their opinions and their lack of specialized knowledge about industrial
processes, were poor decision-makers in most fields of social policy.
Frankfurter wrote that:
The veto power of the Supreme Court ... is at once the
most destructive and the least responsible [tool of
government]: the most destructive, because judicial
nullification on grounds of constitutionality stops
experimentation at its source, and bars increase to the fund
of social knowledge by scientific tests of trial and error;
the least responsible, because it so often turns on the
fortuitous circumstances which determine a majority
decision and shelters the fallible judgment of individual
Justices, in matters of fact and opinion not peculiarly
within the special competence of judges, behind the
impersonal dooms of the Constitution.26'
For Frankfurter, this lack of judicial expertise meant that deference
258Id. at 145.
259As

Sanford Levinson wrote of Frankfurter, his "conception of America, and of the American

presidency as represented by Franklin Roosevelt, led him to accept absolutely the major premise
underlying his theory ofjudicial restraint--namely, the United States is in fact an open polity, and there
is therefore no need for an alert and active Court to further the development of greater openness."
Levinson,
260 supra note 246, at 430.
Id at 446.
261 FRANKFURTER, supra note 254, at 50-51.
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should attach not only to the decisions of elected representatives, but also
to those of agencies tasked with specifying the meaning of broad policy
objectives and implementing those objectives. In his view, the Court was
not an appropriate guard against bureaucratic mistakes or abuses of
discretion. The "ultimate protection" against abuse was "to be found in
ourselves, our zeal for liberty. '26 2 This zeal had to be "institutionalized
through machinery and processes. 2 63 And successful institutionalization
"largely depend[ed] on very high standards of professional service." 264 In
other words, so long as merit and objective knowledge shaped
administrative decision-making, the dangers presented by an unchecked
executive or by bureaucratic discretion remained limited. This led him to
conclude that in matters of administrative practice, the judiciary simply
should assess whether decisions were consistent with the outer limits of
rational policy.
Once on the Supreme Court, Frankfurter employed such a "rational
basis" test to assert a remarkably expansive vision of judicial deference, in
one case arguing that:
[c]ertainly in a domain of knowledge still shifting and
growing, and in a field where judgment is therefore
necessarily beset by the necessity of inferences bordering
on conjecture even for those learned in the art, it would be
presumptuous for courts . . . to deem the view of the
administrative tribunal . . . offensive to the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 65
In fact, the Court should go so far as to defer to administrative judgments
''even in the face of convincing proof that a different result would have
been better., 266 At root, Frankfurter saw judicial intervention as liable to
interject subjective prejudices and arbitrariness into public policymaking in
ways that countermanded much needed and socially beneficial expertise.
B. Security, Executive Practice,and the FunctionalConstitution
The extent to which Frankfurter imagined specialized knowledge as a
limitation on judicial activism is most powerfully highlighted by his vision
of executive leadership in questions of security. As World War II replaced
the Depression as the overwhelming collective problem, Frankfurter
262 Id. at 159.
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readily employed the same judicial logic of deference to defend executive
discretion and broad acceptance of judgments grounded in military
necessity. In case after case, during and after World War II, Frankfurter
developed a national security jurisprudence built on constitutional
flexibility and presidential power, often expanding the potential boundaries
for future executive authority even in those cases in which he technically
ruled against the executive branch.
In the context of military tribunals and the domestic treatment of those
of Japanese descent, Frankfurter did not simply defend executive policies;
he played the role of White House cheerleader on the Supreme Court,
going out of his way to convince fellow justices to abstain from
constraining presidential actions. Years later, Frankfurter referred to the
decision in Ex parte Quirin, as "not a happy precedent. ' '267 There the
Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of a U.S. military tribunal,
established by executive proclamation, to prosecute suspected saboteurs
sent by the Nazi government.26 8 At the time, however, Frankfurter strongly
backed the constitutionality of the tribunals. In the days preceding
Roosevelt's proclamation, he had frequent interactions with the White
House, even telling Secretary of War Henry Stimson that the tribunal
should be composed of soldiers entirely,2 69 as civilians may not fully
appreciate the danger posed to the homeland by Nazi infiltration. Despite
these encounters and the fact that months before the Court even agreed to
hear the case Frankfurter already was committed to backing Roosevelt's
actions, he refused to recuse himself from the case.27 ° Instead, he actively
campaigned on the Court for a single and unanimous majority opinion
defending the executive prerogative. As legal scholar Louis Fisher writes:
At some point in October, when it looked like the Court
might fragment with separate statements, Frankfurter
wrote a bizarre document he called "F. F.'s
Soliloquy".... The soliloquy represented a conversation
between Frankfurter and the saboteurs, six of whom were
now dead. After listening to their legal claim, he called
them "damned scoundrels [who] have a helluva cheek to
ask for a writ that would take you out of the hands of the
Military Commission." He referred to them as "just lowdown, ordinary, enemy spies," and that there was no cause

267FISHER, supra note 99, at 124 (quoting Justice Frankfurter) (explaining that it was "extremely
undesirable" to announce a decision on the merits without any type of opinion accompanying it).
268Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942).
269FISHER, supranote 99, at 108.
270
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to create "a bitter conflict" among the
271three branches "after
your bodies will be rotting in lime.,
Although Frankfurter's strong sentiments no doubt were influenced by
the extreme nature of the Nazi regime in Germany, his approach to the case
was hardly an anomaly. In 1943, when the legality of the military's
domestic curfew on all enemy aliens-including Italians, Germans, and
both citizen and non-citizen Japanese-reached the Supreme Court,272
Frankfurter played a similar role to the role he played in Quirin a year
earlier. In particular, he fought behind the scenes again to guarantee a
unanimous opinion in Hirabayashi v. United States, arguing that any
dissension on the Court would undermine national unity during a time of
war and suggest to the public that the justices lacked confidence in
presidential and military judgments.273 He ultimately convinced Justice
Frank Murphy to recast his dissenting opinion as
a concurrence, in the
2 4
curfew.
the
upholding
vote
9-0
a
process ensuring
The following year, when the Court once more was faced with the
constitutionality of presidential and military orders-this time to intern
110,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans living on the Pacific CoastFrankfurter no longer could maintain a united front on the Court, as
Murphy along with Justices Robert Jackson and Owen Roberts all
dissented.275 Still, in his concurrence in Korematsu v. United States,
Frankfurter reasserted the importance of a highly deferential review of
executive practices, especially in security contexts where the government
acted on the basis of perceived military necessity. 276 For Frankfurter, just
as judges did not have the social scientific knowledge to assess the
intricacies of industrial life, they similarly lacked the capacity to determine
what may or may not be required during wartime. Only military and civil
defense professionals truly knew what dangers the country faced and how
best to employ intelligence gathering, technological hardware, and the
coercive tools of the state to confront these threats to security. In his view
the "respective spheres of action" of judges and of military personnel were
27 1

d. at 116.

272Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1942).
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See Dennis J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the
Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 455, 466-67 (2002) (discussing Frankfurter's efforts to
unite the Court around one unanimous opinion in Hirabayashi).
274See Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 113 (Murphy, J., concurring) (explaining that his affirmance in
judgment should not be understood as "intimating that the military authorities in time of war are subject
to no restraints whatsoever, or that they are free to impose any restrictions they may choose on the
rights and liberties of individual citizens or groups of citizens"). For more on the case and
Frankfurter's private negotiations, see STONE, supra note 99, at 297-99.
275
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting); id.at 233
(Murphy, J., dissenting); id.at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
276
Id.at 224-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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fundamentally "different. 2 77
In dissent, Murphy challenged this vision of judicial deference and
reminded those in the majority of the Mitchell v. Harmony standard, which
had long been the Supreme Court's approach to assessing military
necessity:
The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of
military necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any
of his constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is
reasonably related to a public danger that is so
"immediate, imminent, and impending" as not to admit of
delay and not to permit the intervention of ordinary
constitutional processes to alleviate the danger.278
According to Murphy, judges enjoyed the right to aggressively interrogate
the necessity of military actions and had the ability to do so on the basis of
shared and common knowledge.
But for Frankfurter, ordinary rationality was an unhelpful guide in
matters of war and peace, and the same extreme deference-underscored
by the Court's rational basis test-that applied in other policymaking
arenas was appropriate when it came to professional judgments about
warfare and emergency. In fact, Frankfurter argued that what counted as
constitutional inevitably expanded depending on circumstance and
ultimately on whether experts trained in the science of warfare found their
actions to be "'reasonably expedient military precautions., 279 In his
opinion,
the validity of action under the war power must be judged
wholly in the context of the war. That action is not to be
stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of
peace would be lawless. To talk about a military order
that expresses an allowable judgment of war needs by
those entrusted with the duty of conducting war as "an
unconstitutional order" is to suffuse a part of the
Constitution with an atmosphere of unconstitutionality.2 8 °
In effect, Frankfurter read the Constitution flexibly-as a set of functional

277 Id. at

225.
Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 134-35 (1851)).
Id. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 224-25.
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powers that adapted to fit the security needs of the community. 281 Just as
in the case of economic policy, he believed that to allow the abstract
thinking and "dialectic subtleties '282 of the Court to trump the specialized
expertise of skilled professionals would leave the country in grave danger
and at the mercy of its enemies.
Even when Frankfurter, in the context of the Korean War, was willing
to curtail executive authority, he did so in a way that, as Jules Lobel has
noted, contained "the seeds for an expansion of the President's emergency
power.''283 In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court
invalidated President Truman's seizure of the steel mills, holding that he
had neither the statutory nor constitutional authority to do so, especially
given Congress's explicit refusal to delegate this power when passing the
While Justice Hugo Black's opinion,
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 .284
delivering the judgment of the court, (no opinion received a majority of
votes) emphasized textualism and clear formal categories of legality and
illegality, Frankfurter's concurrence reiterated that the Constitution had to
be read as a functional document. To begin with, this meant that while
such authority may not have been justified in the case at the hand, the
President nonetheless enjoyed inherent emergency power depending on the
285
Even more important, congressional acquiescence to
circumstances.
executive practice also had the potential to create a presumption in favor of
constitutionality, in effect providing the President with legally-sanctioned
lawmaking powers. Quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Frankfurter
explicitly rejected Black's textual approach and declared that "' [t]he great
the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
ordinances of
286
and white.'
According to Frankfurter, the Constitution had to be understood in the
context of contemporary problems and as capable of contracting or
extending its allocation of authority based on society's objective needs. He
maintained that, "[i]t is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them., 287 For Frankfurter,
281For more on Frankfurter's account of a functional theory of the Constitution, see Lobel, supra
note 109, at 1410-12.
2
. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
283Lobel, supra note 109, at 1410.
284Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) (plurality opinion).
285In hinting at the potential legitimacy of inherent presidential authority under other, unspecified

conditions, Frankfurter started his concurrence by writing: "We must.., put to one side consideration
of what powers the President would have had if there had been no legislation whatever bearing on the
authority asserted by the seizure, or if the seizure had been only for a short, explicitly temporary
period ....
" Id.at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
286Id. (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting));
see also Lobel, supra note 109, at 1411.
287Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

CONNECTICUTLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 44:1417

this fluid reading of the law was an essential corollary to his larger
judgments about security expertise. For government to implement policies
on the basis of empirically tested evidence, the empty formalism of the
courtroom could not be used as a tool to hamstring properly informed
decision-making. As Frankfurter stated in Korematsu, it was his belief that
the victory of such formalism over professional reason could not have been
the wish of the Constitution's "hard-headed Framers. 2 88
C. ContemporaryCase Law andFrankfurter'sProgeny
At present, Frankfurter's vision of constitutional flexibility and his
faith in security expertise have become defining features of how the courts
often address questions of threat and emergency. In the process, judges
and lawyers have embedded in contemporary constitutional interpretation a
fundamental security divide between elite and lay capacities, one that
promotes the increasing legal sanction of discretionary executive power.
Take, for example, the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Holder v.
HumanitarianLaw Project,289 which was a striking example of how the
conventional wisdom regarding security and knowledge has shifted since
the days of Mitchell v. Harmony. In HumanitarianLaw Project, Chief
Justice John Roberts' majority opinion upheld the constitutionality of the
"material support statute," 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, as it applied specifically to
otherwise lawful and nonviolent support of foreign entities designated by
the State Department as "terrorist" organizations.2 9
In that case, the
Humanitarian Law Project ("HLP"), a non-governmental organization
("NGO") with consultative status at the United Nations, had sought to
provide humanitarian assistance to two groups: the Kurdish People's Party
("PKK") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"). The HLP's
objective was to limit the propensity of the PKK and LTTE to resort to
terrorism by promoting peaceful means for the groups to advocate on
behalf of Kurdish and Tamil communities.2 9' In defending the criminal
prohibition of "material support," the Court concluded that all external
support, even peaceful training, was a "fungible" commodity, which
"free[d] up other resources within the organization that may be put to
violent ends. 292
In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer questioned the fungibility claim,
noting that the Government had provided "no empirical information" to
288 Korematsu
289

v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).

2

9 Id. at 2712.
HLP hoped to train the PKK and the LTTE in how to use international law to resolve
disputes, including how to petition the United Nations and other representative bodies for relief. Id. at
2716.
'92Id. at 2725.
291 The
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support this proposition and that "[t]here [was] no obvious way in which
undertaking advocacy for political change ...[was] fungible with other
resources that might be put to more sinister ends . ...,,293 The majority's
reply was quite telling. Rather than marshaling concrete evidence, the
Court invoked "an affidavit stating the Executive Branch's conclusion on
that question.' 294 Indeed, the Court continued by explaining that in matters
of security, the executive branch's judgments were entitled to deference,
regardless of whether it had provided "hard proof-with 'detail,' 'specific
facts,' and 'specific evidence.' '2 95 In this particular "area," where the
"impact of certain conduct [was] difficult to assess," the judiciary's "lack
or capacity to "draw[] factual inferences" was
of competence"
"marked., 296 In effect, the Court maintained-in language virtually
identical to Frankfurter's a half century earlier-that when it came to
making sense of gathering threats, judges (much like citizens generally)
did not possess the specialized skills needed to understand complex and
In issues of common defense, an
often conflicting information.
interpretative gulf existed between expert and layperson, one that the
judiciary was bound to respect.
The view expressed in HumanitarianLaw Project follows the logic
present in numerous other opinions-where the courts avoid challenging
executive branch decisions by claiming security matters to be beyond the
competence of the judiciary. As the Third Circuit declared in postSeptember 11 litigation concerning secret deportation hearings, "[w]e are
quite hesitant to conduct a judicial inquiry into the credibility of [the
government's] security concerns, as national security is an area where
courts have traditionally extended great deference to Executive
expertise.29 Indeed what is most remarkable about the invocation of
security expertise is that it does not only occur in the context of arcane
intelligence debates, but also when questions of public record and
seemingly common sense facts are involved. For example, the courts in
recent years have proved especially unwilling to adjudicate as a question of
fact whether or not military "hostilities" are imminent or constitute an
actual state of war. In 1988, escalating tensions and tit-for-tat reprisals
between the United States and Iran in the Persian Gulf, referred to as the
"Tanker War," ultimately led a U.S. cruiser to mistakenly shoot down a
293Id.
294Id.

at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
at 2727 (majority opinion).

295 Id.
296 id.

297
N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002). This litigation
produced a split in the circuits that remains unaddressed by the Supreme Court. While the Third
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the government's decision to close hundreds of deportation
hearings deemed of "special interest," the Sixth Circuit-quoted in the introduction-struck down the
practice. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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civilian Iranian airliner in the Persian Gulf, killing 290 people.298 The
reprisals generated litigation about whether the President was required
under the War Powers Resolution to file an "imminent hostilities report"
299
and to involve Congress at an early stage in military decision-making.
In Lowry v. Reagan, the district court however found the case to present a
non-justiciable political question. °° Whether or not hostilities were
imminent was a determination beyond the fact-finding capacities of any
court, given the nature of the judicial process and the "Court's
30 1 lack of
access to intelligence information and other pertinent expertise."
Later, in the lead up to the First Gulf War with Iraq, another district
court similarly concluded that assessments of whether or not a war existed
or of what empirical conditions would even amount to war were outside
the scope of judicial knowledge. As the judge in the case, Royce
Lamberth, wrote:
[The plaintiff] asks the court to find that the President's
deployment of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf constitutes
"war," "imminent hostilities," or even the prelude to
offensive war. Time and again courts have refused to
exercise jurisdiction in such cases and undertake such
30 2
determinations because courts are ill-equipped to do so.
For Taney, Lamberth's claim would have been stunning to say the least.
Nothing was more a matter of general and collective understanding than
whether or not hostilities were underway or imminent. The difference
between a condition of peace and one of war was self-evident and required
298 Michael

R. Gordon, U.S. Account of Downing oflran Jet Criticized,N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1992,

at A7 (discussing the controversy surrounding the mistaken shooting of the civilian airliner).
299See Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 334 (D.D.C. 1987) (involving a claim filed by
Members of the House of Representatives seeking a declaration that the War Powers Resolution
required the President to file reports concerning past and future involvement the U.S. Armed Forces
had in the Persian Gulf).
300Id.at 341. Courts have developed a complex set of jurisprudential arguments to explain why
certain disputes are not justiciable or are outside the scope of judicial determination. One central
rationale for non-justiciability is the political question doctrine, which asserts that if the subject matter
is fundamentally "political," then it should be entrusted to the other branches for resolution. For more
on the doctrine, see Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 75 (1961) (providing examples of several historical cases in which the
issue presented was not a justiciable controversy); Fritz W. Sharpf, JudicialReview and the Political
Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 533-38 (1966) (discussing the political question
doctrine as a form of judicial avoidance); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1959) (articulating political questions as questions that
"are not to be resolved judicially, although they involve constitutional interpretation and arise in the
course of litigation").
30,
Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 340 n.53.
302Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990).
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only common sense to discern. In fact, to reject this belief left the public at
the whim of executive determinations of when, and in what circumstances,
to use state violence. It meant that one of the most momentous decisions
in public life, a decision which was properly the domain of democratic
deliberation, instead would be captured by unchecked political elites.
For Lamberth's view to make sense, let alone for it to be persuasive, a
very different sociological vision of prospective threat would have to be
compelling: one in line with the security concept that emerged and took
hold in the 1930s and 1940s. In particular, one would have to see the
category of "war" as far more fluid and difficult to decipher. Threats must
be viewed as pervasive and the country interpreted as in a near continuous
state of existing or potential conflict, blurring any clear divide between a
presumptive condition of peace and an extraordinary one of war. Under
such circumstances, what amounts to actual "hostilities" or what counts as
"imminent" may well be difficult to determine. Indeed, such sociological
presumptions lay at the heart of Frankfurter's defense of extreme judicial
deference and his belief that due to modem complexities only specialized
information and expertise could resolve even elementary security
questions.
The prevalence of these continuities between Frankfurter's vision and
contemporary judicial arguments raise serious concerns with today's
conceptual framework. Certainly, Frankfurter's role during World War II
in defending and promoting a number of infamous judicial decisions
highlights the potential abuses embedded in a legal discourse premised on
the specially-situated knowledge of executive officials and military
personnel. As the example of Japanese internment dramatizes, too strong
an assumption of expert understanding can easily allow elite prejudicesand with it state violence-to run rampant and unconstrained. For the
present, it hints at an obvious question: How skeptical should we be of
current assertions of expertise and, indeed, of the dominant security
framework itself? One claim, repeated especially in the wake of
September 11, has been that regardless of normative legitimacy, the
prevailing security concept-with its account of unique knowledge,
insulation, and hierarchy-is simply an unavoidable consequence of
existing global dangers. Even if Herring and Frankfurter may have been
wrong in principle about their answer to the question "who decides in
matters of security?" they nevertheless were right to believe that
complexity and endemic threat make it impossible to defend the old
Lockean sensibility. The final pages of this Article explore this basic
question of the degree to which objective conditions justify the conceptual
shifts. The conclusion then offers some initial reflections on what might
be required to limit the government's expansive security powers.
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE OPENNESS OF THREATS

The ideological transformation in the meaning of security has helped
to generate a massive and largely secret infrastructure of overlapping
executive agencies, all tasked with gathering information and keeping the
country safe from perceived threats. In 2010, The Washington Post
produced a series of articles outlining the buildings, personnel, and
companies that make up this hidden national security apparatus.
According to journalists Dana Priest and William Arkin, there exist
"[s]ome 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies"
across 10,000 locations in the United States, all working on
"counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence."' 303 This apparatus
is especially concentrated in the Washington, D.C. area, which amounts to
"the capital of an alternative geography of the United States. ' 3°4 Employed
by these hidden agencies and bureaucratic entities are some 854,000
people (approximately 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington
itself) who hold top-secret clearances.3 °5 As Priest and Arkin make clear,
the most elite of those with such clearance are highly trained experts,
ranging from scientists and economists to regional specialists. "To do
what it does, the NSA [National Security Agency] relies on the largest
and technology
number of mathematicians in the world. It needs linguists
'30 6
'
'crippies.
as
known
cryptologists,
as
well
experts, as
These professionals cluster together in neighborhoods that are among
the wealthiest in the country-six of the ten richest counties in the United
States according to Census Bureau data.307 As the executive of Howard
County, Virginia, one such community, declared, "[t]hese are some of the
most brilliant people in the world .... They demand good schools and a
high quality of life. 30 8 School excellence is particularly important, as
education holds the key to sustaining elevated professional and financial
status across generations. In fact, some schools are even "adopting a
curriculum . . .that will teach students as young as 10 what kind of
lifestyle it takes to get a security clearance and what kind of behavior
would disqualify them. 30 9 The implicit aim of this curriculum is to ensure
that the children of NSA mathematicians and Defense Department linguists
can one day succeed their parents on the job.
In effect, what Priest and Arkin detail is a striking illustration of how
303Dana

Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST,

July 19, 2010, at Al.
304
Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, The Secrets Next Door, WASH. POST, July 21, 2010, at Al.
305 id.
3
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308 id.
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security has transformed from a matter of ordinary judgment into one of
elite skill. They also underscore how this transformation is bound to a
related set of developments regarding social privilege and statusdevelopments that would have been welcome to Frankfurter but deeply
disillusioning to Brownson, Lincoln, and Taney. Such changes highlight
how one's professional standing increasingly drives who has a right to
make key institutional choices. Lost in the process, however, is the
longstanding belief that issues of war and peace are fundamentally a
domain of common care marked by democratic intelligence and shared
responsibility.
Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today's
dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective
sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims
undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more
directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects
for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means
that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as
Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a
revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one
of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers.
Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian
regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a
world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is
imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states."'
310

These arguments, especially about the overwhelming dangers posed by Islamic extremism,

have become the bread and butter of presidential rhetoric regardless of political party. For a selection
of such claims made by both Presidents Bush and Obama, see President George W. Bush, Remarks to
the Military Officers Association of America, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1557, 1559 (Sept. 5,
2006) (identifying an Al Qaeda strategy to create "numerous, decentralized operating bases across the
world, from which they can plan new attacks and advance their vision of a unified, totalitarian Islamic
state that can confront and eventually destroy the free world"); President George W. Bush, Address
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 129, 130 (Jan. 29,
2002) (stating that the "war on terror" has only just begun, because there are "[tihousands of dangerous
killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, [that] are now spread
throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning"); President Barack
Obama, Address to the Nation on the Drawdown of United States Military Personnel in Afghanistan,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1, 2 (June 22, 2011) (recognizing that the "tide of war is receding" but
still proposing a long term goal of leaving no safe haven from which Al Qaeda and its affiliates can
attack the United States).
These presidential assertions also mirror the conventional wisdom as expounded by key foreign
policy figures in both Democratic and Republican parties, as highlighted by Chair Thomas Kean's and
Vice-Chair Lee Hamilton's public statement on the release of the 9/11 Commission report. See
THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE H. HAMILTON, PUBLIC STATEMENT: RELEASE OF 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
5 (July 22, 2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/91l/report/91 IReportStatement.pdf
("The American people must be prepared for a long and difficult struggle. We face a determined
enemy who sees this as a war of attrition-indeed, as an epochal struggle. We expect further attacks.
Against such an enemy, there can be no complacency. This is the challenge of our generation."); see
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Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modem threats
makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes
and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the
further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S. military
permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies
wherever they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modem legal and
political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated
decision-making are simply the necessary consequence of these externally
generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an
empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public
agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint 3 '-greatly
outweigh the costs.
Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the
conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are
not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular,
a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger
suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather
are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the
openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat
implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not selfevident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment,
claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological
presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf
between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security
may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the
question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or
insular our institutions should be-remains open as well.
Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and
chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the
also 9/11 COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE
UNITED
STATES:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
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available
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http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/91 I/report/91IReportExec.pdf (describing Al Qaeda as representing an
ideology rather than a finite group of people and stating that no matter who is captured or killedreferring at the time to Osama Bin Laden--there would still be a serious threat due to the decentralized
nature of terrorist groups).
31'As of 2009, some 516,273 military service members-not including Department of Defense
civilian officials-were deployed abroad, stationed across 716 reported overseas bases in
approximately 150 foreign states (nearly eighty percent of the world's countries). DEP'T OF DEF., BASE
STRUCTURE REPORT DoD-22 (2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2009baseline.pdf;
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world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for
nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety.
Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth
century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous12
communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers.
But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling
than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of
these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address
them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated
with subjective political assessments-assessments that carry with them
preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk
constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should
be in foreign policy.
In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the
modem security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the
politicalrather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats.
In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the
idea of insecurity and America's post-World War II position of global
primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. 313
In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in
terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives
meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the
needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer
"adequate" for the "20th-century nation. '314 For Fulbright, the driving
impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was
the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and
military power. ' '315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and
war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States
found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that
accompany such power., 3 16 According to Fulbright, the United States had
311See DAVID CAMPBELL, WRITING SECURITY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE

POLITICS OF IDENTITY 13-14 (1998) (describing the nineteenth century as a time of continental
expansion, in which settlers engaged in near constant battles with Indians, the British, and Mexicans);
see also RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE MYTHOLOGY

OF THE

AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1600-1860 4 (2000) (presenting the republic's founders as a group who "tore
violently a nation from implacable and opulent wilderness" and who saw the Native Americans as the
personification of this wilderness).
313See Christopher Layne & Benjamin Schwartz, American Hegemony-Without an Enemy, 92
FOREIGN POL'Y 5, 5-10, 22 (1993) (describing America's interventionist foreign policy after World
War II and stating "[tioday, America's insecurity is the self-inflicted consequence of a foreign policy
that equates national interests with the maintenance of world order.").
314j. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century
Constitution,47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1 (1961).
315id.
3 16
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both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that
existed at the edges of American authority.3 17 Thus, rather than being
purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself
deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global
primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only
technological change, but also the belief that the United States' own
national security rested on the successful projection of power into the
internal affairs of foreign states.
The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an
underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political
question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as
generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative
judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion.3 18 To appreciate the
open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the
presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger facing the
country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on
Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities
from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home.3 19 While the
fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which
have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in
perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger-requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent
with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one
presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative
security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended,
especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the
political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting
foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of
permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional
values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched
Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has
become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment
may be equally compelling.
It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of
317See

id. at 1-2 (stating that the preservation of the American system of values had come to

depend on the nation's "ability to cope with worldwide revolutionary forces").
318For more on the historical relationship in American life between accounts of security and
contested political values, see generally CAMPBELL, supra note 312 (discussing the linkage between the
concept of "danger" and American identity and foreign policy); see also Joseph Margulies & Hope
Metcalf, TerrorizingAcademia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 436 (2011) (arguing that post-9/1 I responses
to perceived threats are bound more to longstanding American practices toward communal "others"
than to objective evaluations of danger).
3 9

NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., 2009 NCTC REPORT ON TERRORISM 19 (2010), available at

http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2009_report on terrorism.pdf.
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modem security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States'
massive intelligence infrastructure.
To the extent that political
assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that
instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the
interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective
security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to
view external actors and their motivations. These assumptions mean that
while modem conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the
presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias
than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available
information. It further underlines that the question of who decides cannot
be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge.
If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite
awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic
political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a
variety of security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise."32 ° At
present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret
information sustained by the modem security concept. Today, it is
commonplace for government officials to leak security material about
terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the
public debate. 32 1 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite
information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating
mass voice into state decision-making.
But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret
information generally is treated as worthy of a higher status than
information already present in the public realm-the shared collective
information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about
emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq
320Tying security to other domains of public policy, one can see the failure of presumed expertise

in events that range from the financial meltdown to the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN

THE UNITED STATES xvii (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf (blaming the Federal Reserve for contributing to the 2008 financial meltdown because of the
Reserve's failure to set prudent mortgage-lending standards, as well as financial institutions, generally,
for not examining mortgage securities properly and thus helping to precipitate the meltdown); Dana
Priest, Report FindsNo Evidence Syria Hid IraqiArms, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2005, at Al (noting that
the Iraq Survey Group ultimately found no proof of American officials' claims that "Syria worked in
tandem with Hussein's government to hide weapons before the U.S.-led invasion").
321See, e.g., David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Cheney's Aide Says PresidentApproved Leak,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at Al (discussing I. Lewis Libby's testimony that President Bush, through
Vice President Cheney, authorized the disclosure in July 2003 of classified prewar intelligence
estimates on Iraq); James Risen, Democrat Lodges Complaints over Leaks from Bush Camp, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A21 (noting concerns by "[tihe ranking Democrat on the Senate intelligence
committee . . .that senior Bush administration officials [had] disclosed classified information to a
prominent journalist 'for partisan purposes"').
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War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is
flawed,322 its status as secret masks these problems and allows
policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality
highlights the importance of approaching security information with far
greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be
more Hobbesian-marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty
as opposed to verifiable fact-than policymakers admit.
If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modem security
concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for
reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and
security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the
procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars-emphasizing new
statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness-is that they mistake
a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore
the extent to which governing practices are the product of background
political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional
expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent
that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from
hidden and potentially limitless assailants-danger too complex for the
average citizen to comprehend independently-it is inevitable that
institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize
power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise.
Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the
relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the
underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal
and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate
about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the
broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift
in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that it
remains unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these
questions. Unless such a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing
security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

322Yet

another recent and telling illustration of flawed secret information concerns the assessment

by military analysts at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba of the threat posed by many of those detained at the
prison. See Nitasha Tiku, Leaked Gitmo Files Reveal Prisoners' Threat Level Based on Flawed
http://nymag.com/daily/inteV2011/04/
25,
2011,
Apr.
MAG.,
N.Y.
Evidence,
leaked gitmo files revealflaw.html (concluding that files released by the anti-secrecy group
Wikileaks suggest that military analysts often made basic mistakes in interpreting factual evidence and
held as many as 150 innocent people for years based on flawed evidence).

